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Ce document examine la montée et le déclin du commerce de pêche à la  
baleine à Hull au dix-septième siècle. Commençant par les voyages de  
pêche, y compris à la baleine, du port nordique à la fin du seizième et  
début  du  dix-septième  siècle,  il  examine  aussi  bien  la  rivalité  et  la  
concurrence néfaste entre les aventuriers de Hull et la Compagnie de  
Moscovie de Londres, que le conflit entre les anglais et les hollandais  
pour l'accès aux baies du Spitzberg. Après un début prometteur, qui a été  
soutenu pendant les années 1630, le commerce de la pêche à la baleine 
de Hull  a ensuite rencontré des difficultés.  En dépit  des efforts  de le  
maintenir au cour des décennies tourmentées 1640 et 1650, ce commerce 
nouveau et potentiellement lucratif a été effectivement abandonné dès la  
deuxième moitié du dix-septième siècle.
England  played  a  leading  role  in  the  development  of  Arctic  whaling  at 
Spitsbergen during the early seventeenth century. Although the origins of the trade are 
obscure, the exploitation of these rich northern waters was European in scope. It  also 
formed  part  of  a  broader  European  encounter  with  the  Arctic  in  which  exploration, 
particularly the search for a northern passage to Asia, was underwritten by commercial 
and fishing enterprise. At various times during this period the marine resources of the 
Arctic attracted the interest of maritime communities within and beyond the confines of 
the North Sea. The international dimensions of the commercial penetration of the north 
led to the participation of Spanish, French, Dutch, Danish, German and English vessels in 
whale  hunting  at  Spitsbergen,  in  circumstances  that  provoked  fierce  rivalry between 
competing venturers and companies. During its early years the English whaling trade was 
marked  by  aggressive  competition  between  the  Muscovy  Company  and  the  Dutch 
Noordsche Compagnie for control of the best bays and harbours at Spitsbergen.1 But this
1 The early whaling trade at Spitsbergen is discussed in Gordon Jackson, The British Whaling 
Trade (London, 1978); J.T. Jenkins,  A History of the Whale Fisheries (London, 1921); Sir 
Martin Conway, No Man’s Land: A History of Spitsbergen from its Discovery in 1596 to the  
Beginning  of  the  Scientific  Exploration  of  the  Country (Cambridge,  1906);  and  Richard 
Vaughan,  The Arctic:  A History (Stroud,  1994).  A.G.F.  van  Holk  (ed.),  Early  European 
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was  soon  complicated  by  the  activities  of  independent  traders  who  challenged  and 
effectively  undermined  corporate  attempts  to  dominate  a  rapidly  developing  new 
business. The peculiar character of the Spitsbergen trade meant that well organized local 
enterprises could have far-reaching implications for the growth of the northern whaling 
trade,  encouraging  commercial  de-regulation  in  circumstances  which  favoured 
competition and conflict.  In  England the  most  serious  and sustained challenge to the 
Muscovy Company came from the merchants and mariners of Hull, whose interests in the 
trade  occasionally  rivalled  those  of  the  Londoners.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to 
examine the part played by Hull in the development of English whaling at Spitsbergen, 
within the context of its prolonged dispute with the Muscovy Company. While the rivalry 
between the  two sides  varied in  intensity,  and was occasionally overlaid  by signs  of 
cooperation,  the  nature  of  the  dispute  also raised serious  issues  concerning maritime 
rights and jurisdictions that affected the English whaling trade during a difficult period of 
rapid expansion, contraction and collapse.2
1. Arctic Whaling
English interest  in whaling was slow to germinate.  For most  of  the sixteenth 
century the trade was dominated by the Basques, who had originally hunted the right 
whale in the Bay of Biscay using shore-based sites and methods; however, the decline of 
local  supplies  encouraged Basque whalemen to  develop long-distance whaling in  the 
Strait of Belle Isle, off southern Labrador.3 Their prey were relatively easy to catch with 
the requisite skills and experience. Right whales are docile and slow moving. They feed 
on plankton which is filtered from water in a large jaw, lined with baleen or bone plates, 
as they move slowly along the surface. Their predictable behaviour, when understood by 
whalemen, made them easier to take. As they floated when dead, it was possible for the 
Basques and others to hunt  them at  sea  in  small  vessels  with harpoons.  Before their 
decline  as  a  result  of  intensive  hunting,  large  numbers  of  right  whales  (balaena 
mysticetus) migrated across rich feeding grounds in the Arctic during the short summer 
season. The break up of the pack ice led to a short-lived increase in plankton, creating 
bountiful supplies of food which supported a substantial population of whales. As the ice 
receded and broke up, they congregated in the bays and harbours of Spitsbergen as well 
as  in  the  sea  to  the  west.4 Under  the  benign  protection  of  this  desolate  and  distant 
environment they remained free from the dangers of commercial hunting until the early 
Exploitation of the Northern Atlantic 800-1700 (Groningen, 1981) is a valuable collection of 
essays.
2 Bo Johnson Theutenberg,  “Mare Clausum et  Mare Liberum,” Arctic,  37 (1984),  481-92; 
T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh & London, 1911), 527-8.
3 Selma Huxley Barkham, “The Basque Whaling Establishments in Labrador 1536-1632: A 
Summary,”  Arctic, 37(1984), 515-19; Jeremy Cherfas,  The Hunting of the Whale (London, 
1988), 59-60; Jackson, British Whaling Trade, 3-4.
4 Cherfas, Hunting the Whale, 17-18, 29, 40, 55 (where the hunting of right whales is likened 
to hunting a herd of bison); Jackson, British Whaling Trade, 7-9. During a voyage of 1671 
Frederick Martens, of Hamburg, noted great numbers in the west ice. Adam White (ed.),  A 
Collection of Documents on Spitzbergen & Greenland (Hakluyt Society, 18, 1855), 33.
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seventeenth century.
Because of their number and accessibility, the right whale became the basis of 
Arctic whaling at Spitsbergen; other species were too difficult or dangerous to take with 
the available technology. Essentially the economic driving-force behind the emergence of 
this new trade was the growth of demand for whale oil in many parts of north-western 
Europe. A single adult whale, weighing up to 55 tons, could produce between 20 and 30 
tons of oil and possibly one ton of baleen or whale-bone.5 In England oil was valued for a 
variety  of  purposes,  as  fuel  for  lamps,  an  agent  in  the  manufacture  of  textiles,  and 
particularly as a raw material in the production of soap. Though initially of much lesser 
value, whale-bone also had a variety of uses: its flexibility and durability were especially 
prized in the cutlery and clothing trades. By the mid-seventeenth century it was being 
used in women’s dress. From the outset, however, the demand for whale products was 
affected by the availability of alternatives; for example, many soap-makers insisted that 
whale oil produced poor quality soap compared with that made from vegetable oil.6 Such 
conditions exerted a powerful influence on market demand and prices, complicating the 
early development of the whaling trade.
During the early seventeenth century the trade at Spitsbergen was based on bay-
whaling which linked sea and shore through a progression of overlapping and discrete 
activities, though these were always at risk from even a small change in the climate and 
its impact on the extent of the pack ice. Hunting whales in the more accessible bays and 
coves of the archipelago was followed by the extraction of oil at temporary sites ashore. 
In these circumstances whaling vessels tried to get into harbour at Spitsbergen shortly 
before the arrival of the whales, allowing men to get ashore to erect small huts, in which 
equipment was stored, as well  as to prepare the apparatus needed to boil the blubber. 
These try-works included furnaces, coppers and coolers; in some cases this material may 
have been left at Spitsbergen between whaling seasons. The recent excavation of several 
early seventeenth century sites on Edge Island has revealed a well preserved try-works, 
made of stone, that may have been constructed by Thomas Marmaduke of Hull, possibly 
during 1613.7 Fuel  to  operate  the  furnaces  was presumably carried out  as  ballast  by 
whaling  ships,  though  surface  deposits  of  coal  were  available  in  some  parts  of 
Spitsbergen. Whale hunting was difficult  work, calling for skill, hard effort  and some 
degree of luck. The arrival of the whales at Spitsbergen was carefully monitored by their 
hunters, who were able to observe them spouting water from a distance of two or three 
leagues. After they entered the sounds the whales were hunted by small shallops, manned 
with a  crew of rowers,  steersman and harpooner.  When submerged,  the crews of the 
shallops had to try and follow the whale by the wake it left on the surface, while waiting 
5 Vaughan, The Arctic, 77.
6 Jenkins,  History of the Whale Fisheries, 39-40; G. Jackson, “The Rise and Fall of English 
Whaling in the Seventeenth Century,” in van Holk (ed.), Early European Exploitation, 63-5; 
Adam White (ed.), A Collection of Documents on Spitzbergen & Greenland (Hakluyt Society, 
18,  1855),  107-9;  J.R.  Bruijn,  “From  Minor  to  Major  Concern:  Entrepreneurs  in  17th 
Century Dutch Whaling”, in van Holk, Early European Exploitation, 6-7.
7 Louwrens Hacquebord, “Three 17th Century Whaling Stations in Southeastern Svalbard: An 
Archaeological Missing Link,” Polar Record, 24(1988), 126-8.
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for it to rise and spout. When this occurred “they rowe resolutlie towards him, as though 
they intended to force the shallop upon him. But so soone as they come within stroak of 
him, the harponier (who stands up readie in the head of the boat,) darts his harping iron at 
him out of both his hands, wherwith the whale being stricken, he presentlie discends to 
the bottom of the water, and therfor the men in the shallop doe weire out 40, 50, or 60 
fathoms of  rope –  yea,  sometimes  100,  or  more,  according as  the  depth requireth.”8 
According to the subsequent evidence of Launcelot Anderson, a Hull whaling master who 
had experience of thirty-three voyages to Spitsbergen, for reasons of safety the harpooner 
tried to strike the whale in its head or fore-parts.9
For inexperienced seamen this close confrontation with an animal that possessed 
the power to overturn or smash the shallop was probably a terrifying experience. But it 
was followed by a chase that might last several hours and draw the shallop three or four 
miles from the place where the whale was first struck. During the course of the pursuit, 
when the whale emerged above water the crew of the shallop rowed up and struck it with 
long lances. This was one of the most dangerous parts of the hunt, for it was recognized 
that a wounded whale might “frisk and strike with his tail very forceablie, sometimes 
hitting the shallop, and splitting hir asunder, sometimes also maihmeing or killing some 
of the men.”10 In case of accident, therefore, the killing of a whale was usually attended 
by  two  or  three  shallops.  During  these  closing  stages  of  the  chase,  whale  hunters 
attempted to lance their prey as low under water as possible, in an attempt to pierce its 
entrails. After the whale “received his deadlie wound, … casteth he forth blood where 
formerlie he spowted water.”11 As the animal lay stricken and dying, it was tied to the 
shallops and towed to the side of the ship where it was cut up into pieces of blubber, three 
or four feet in length. Anderson recounted that when “shee is dead & floates they lett hir 
alone for 2 or 3 dayes in which tyme shee swells & so a greater part of hir Back appeares 
on the water: then they goe to hir & Cutt off Collops of hir back as deepe as the fatt 
reaches: & as far as the water permitts which done they turn up one side of the Belly & 
lastly the other side & so spades hir and then leave the rest of the Body (except the 
whalebone which they take out of hir mouth) to the mercy of the Sea..”12 The blubber was 
carried ashore and chopped into very small pieces of about one and a half inches, which 
were boiled in large coppers to extract the oil. As it cooled, the oil was poured into butts 
and hogsheads by means of a long trough or gutter of wood.
As this flensing process proceeded the head of the whale was severed from the 
body and towed near to the shore. At low water the baleen, or bone, was cut out with 
hatchets and carried ashore, where it was scraped and rubbed with sand to remove the 
8 Clements R. Markham (ed.), The Voyages of William Baffin, 1612-1622 (Hakluyt Society, 63, 
1881), 74, an account of whale hunting by Fotherby.
9 British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, f. 78v. Sir Martin Conway, “Some Unpublished 
Spitsbergen MSS,” Geographical Journal, 15 (1900), 628-36. 
10 Markham, Voyages of William Baffin, 74.
11 Ibid., 75.
12 British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, f. 79; Markham (ed.), Voyages of William Baffin, 
75-7.
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grease. When clean it  was sorted into five different kinds and made up into bundles. 
Anderson’s account  indicates that  young and old whales were killed indiscriminately, 
leading  to  significant  variations  in  the  amount  of  oil  and  presumably bone  that  was 
acquired: “an ordinary whale will yield 12 tun of oyle: some 20 tun, if large and taken at 
a seasonable time.”13
For  English  seamen  this  was  a  novel  enterprise  which  brought  together  a 
complex of activities that linked fishing and hunting with an industrial and extractive 
process. To some extent the novelty of whaling, especially in a northern fishing port such 
as Hull, was qualified by the way in which it was assimilated into long-distance fishing 
trades and walrus hunting. Although the latter occurred on land, near to the shore, it made 
use  of  similar  equipment  for  hunting  and  processing.  Thus  it  gave  the  Hull  men 
experience of seafaring in the Arctic,  while equipping them with skills  that  could be 
adapted to whaling. After being killed with lances, the hide of the walrus was removed 
and its blubber was “chopped and put into … coppers, and then it is tryed and reduced to 
oile.”14 Experience  and  a  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the  Arctic,  including  some 
understanding  of  the  weather  and  of  the  behaviour  of  whales,  were  of  fundamental 
importance to the development of the whaling trade. Those who undertook such voyages, 
it was noted in the early seventeenth century, “must not onely bee bold and resolute, but 
also  discreet  and  wary.”15 The  accumulation  of  locally shared  information  on  Arctic 
venturing, combined with the publication of accounts of voyages to Spitsbergen, may 
deserve greater emphasis than they have hitherto received, in assisting the growth of the 
trade during these years. Nonetheless whaling was laden with risk. As a German observer 
subsequently reported, whale hunting was like “the chances of gaming …, (while) some 
see and catch more than they desire, … others but at a half mile distance from them see 
not  one,  which  is  very  common.”16 For  the  English,  furthermore,  the  risks  were 
inadvertently complicated by the presence of competing interests in the same sound or 
bay.
The work-cycle that whalemen developed at Spitsbergen called for a combination 
of individual initiative with group cooperation, subject to the constraints of a brief, ever-
receding Arctic summer. While July evenings might be warmed by constant sunlight, 
generally Spitsbergen was a  cold and comfortless environment;  in 1621 the  Venetian 
ambassador  in  London  described  it  as  the  “mother  of  ice”  which,  apart  from whale 
hunting, was “barren and useless.”17 Whaling ships arriving in Bell Sound towards the 
end of May could still find snow covering the land, and the bays and sounds littered with 
straggling ice. Launcelot Anderson reported that vessels “sayld between great masses of 
Ise of 17 or 20 fathome thick, part of which stood as high … as their main masts, off 
13 British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, ff. 79-79v.
14 Markham, Voyages of William Baffin, 79. 
15 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols. (Glasgow, 1906), 
13: 27. 
16 White, A Collection of Documents on Spitzbergen, 33.
17 Calendar of State Papers Venetian 1621-23, 424.
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which run spouts of faire fresh water, when the sun shines upon them.”18 Bad weather, 
storms and fog, disrupted whale hunting and delayed the departure of vessels for home. 
By mid-August wintry conditions might have returned with the first snow fall. Robert 
Fotherby’s account of the trade in the early seventeenth century provides a rare hint of the 
physical and psychological impact of these conditions among men who were undoubtedly 
keen to leave the region. Snow in the middle of August was noisome to the crews of 
whaling vessels, many of whom probably lacked specialized winter clothing, but  “so did 
it also begin to astonish their mindes.”19 In such circumstances the masters of whaling 
ships  tried to  take advantage of  the  opportunities  presented by the  northern summer, 
when night scarcely turned dark. Fotherby noted that men worked around the clock at 
boiling blubber,  with no rest  except  on Sunday,  while later  in the century a  German 
observer reported that whale hunting could continue until mid-night during July.20
In  spite  of  the  potential  hazards  of  Arctic  whaling,  however,  there  is  little 
evidence of serious casualties among the Hull men involved in it. Loss of life and other 
accidents were either unusual or so commonplace as to be barely worth recording; and on 
balance, the former is more likely.21 In effect the whaling trade was as safe as most other 
sectors of  English commercial  enterprise during this  period.  In part  this  reflected the 
ability of whalemen to reduce the level of risk at Spitsbergen through organization and 
cooperation. Masters also had an important role to play in maintaining the morale and 
well-being of crew members, particularly in promoting a sense of community among men 
with varied experiences and from diverse backgrounds. To some extent this may have 
been articulated  through consultation  and  consensus,  customary characteristics  of  the 
fishing trade,  though the structure  and values  which underpinned such methods were 
subject to strain as a result of competition at Spitsbergen between rival interests.
Nevertheless the inherent dangers of the whaling trade were starkly demonstrated 
in 1630 when eight Englishmen were accidentally left at Spitsbergen by the Salutation of 
London. The men got through the winter by feeding on “Frittars or Graves of the Whale,” 
the  unwanted  left-overs  from  boiling  the  blubber,  while  trapped  in  a  “labyrinth  of 
perpetual misery.”22 Nine months after the departure of the  Salutation, they were saved 
by the arrival of two Hull ships in Bell Sound on 25 May 1631. According to a report by 
Edward Pellham, published under the title of Gods Power and Providence, “the Hull men 
now comming neere our Tent, haled it with the usuall word of the Sea, crying ‘Hey’: he 
answered againe with ‘Ho.’”23 The deliverance of these accidental castaways might have 
18 British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, f. 78v.
19 Markham, Voyages of William Baffin, 97. 
20 The German observer was Frederick Martens of Hamburg who wrote an interesting account 
of a voyage to Spitsbergen in 1671. White, A Collection of Documents on Spitsbergen, 9-10; 
Markham (ed.), Voyages of William Baffin, 59. 
21 Disasters could occur on northern voyages: during 1585 two Hull vessels lost 15 men during 
a fishing voyage to Vardø. F.W. Brooks (ed.), Miscellanea, vol. V (Yorkshire Archaeological 
Society, 116, 1951 for 1949), 4.
22 White (ed.), A Collection of Documents on Spitzbergen, 273.
23 Ibid., p. 281. Launcelot Anderson was one of the Hull masters involved. His later evidence 
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been a manifestation of godly power, but it also underlined the endurance, hardihood and 
community among English whalemen.
2.  The emergence of a new trade
Despite the availability of large numbers of right whales in Arctic waters, the 
emergence of English whaling was a protracted, uncertain process that ended in failure 
during the 1660s. Thereafter, until the revival of the trade in the eighteenth century, the 
domestic market for whale products was effectively taken over by suppliers in Dutch and 
German ports. During its early phase of development, English whaling was faced with 
several  interlocking  problems  concerning  the  acquisition  of  suitable  skills  from 
experienced  Basque  whalemen,  and  the  establishment  of  an  effective  infrastructure 
capable of sustaining the growth of a new and demanding trade. Interest in the whaling 
trade during the later sixteenth century appears to have been limited to members of the 
Muscovy Company, and grew out of their efforts to find a north east passage to Cathay. 
In 1577 the Company was granted a monopoly to hunt whales in northern waters with the 
assistance of Basque harpooners.24 A few years later Robert Hitchcock drew attention to 
the perceived profitability of  the  trade in a “Pollitique Platt” for  the  development of 
fisheries. The “killyinge of the Whaile”, he claimed, “is bothe pleasaunt and profitable, 
and without greate charges: yelding greate plentie of Oyle, the tunne wherof is worth 
tenne pound. One of the Shippes maie bryng home to his Porte fiftie Tunne, the whiche is 
worthe  five  hundreth  pounde.”25 Little  came  of  the  Company’s  initative,  however, 
probably because of its greater concern to develop commercial relations with Russia and 
Persia. Consequently when the Company’s interest in whaling revived during the early 
seventeenth century,  it  was  in  circumstances  that  quickly led  to  bitter  rivalry with  a 
variety of competing interests.
The opening up of the northern whaling trade was thus accompanied by tangled 
claims and counter-claims to rights of navigation and territorial possession which were 
focused on Spitsbergen and other islands in the Arctic. Spitsbergen and Bear Island to the 
south were discovered by the Dutch captain, Willem Barents, in June 1596 during his 
third expedition in  search of  a  north east  passage.  Exploration of  the  islands  was of 
secondary  concern  to  the  purpose  of  the  venture  and  the  limited  reconnaissance  of 
Spitsbergen, possibly restricted by ice, had confusing consequences for its identification. 
While some of the Dutch described it as the New Land, and others Spitsbergen, to convey 
an image of its sharp, mountainous profile, Barents claimed that it was part of Greenland, 
a name which the English were to employ alongside the use of “King James’ Newland.”26 
A map of Barents’ route shows part of the coastline of Het Nieuwe Land with several 
adds to the published account of Pellham. British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, f. 78.
24 Vaughan, The Arctic, 124; T.S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company 1553-1603 
(Manchester, 1956, repr.; New York, 1968), 133-4.
25 R.H. Tawney and Eileen Power (eds.), Tudor Economic Documents, 3 vols. (London, 1924), 
3: 246-7.
26 Marijke Spies, Arctic Routes to Fabled Lands: Oliver Brunel and the Passage to China and  
Cathay in the Sixteenth Century (Amsterdam, 1997), 142-3; Conway, No Man’s Land, 11-16.
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inlets and bays, and the surrounding sea teeming with whales and walruses. Although the 
death of Barents during the course of the expedition appears to have dampened interest in 
exploration, reports of the rich marine life in Arctic waters may have encouraged Dutch 
fishing activity off the north coast of Norway and Russia.
The Dutch were joined by Hull fishermen and traders. The Hull men had long-
standing interests in the fishing trade, within and beyond the North Sea. In addition the 
overseas trade of the port was growing during the later sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries.  Hull  merchants  played  a  leading  role  in  the  development  of  Anglo-Baltic 
commercial relations, which laid the basis for the emergence of a specialized trade in 
timber, and they were also involved in pioneering trading ventures with Russia.  Such 
commercial activity was reflected in the growth of shipping: the average size of vessels 
from Hull engaged in trading with the Baltic region appears to have doubled during the 
period from 1580 to 1640. Within this changing commercial environment, enterprising 
traders and shippers promoted northern voyages that combined fishing with small-scale 
trade. From 1570 onwards, indeed, vessels from the port appear to have been sailing to 
Vardø in Finnmark, returning with cargoes of fish and whale oil.27 Claims that Hull ships 
were engaged in whaling at Spitsbergen as early as 1596 are unsubstantiated, however, 
and seem improbable, though William Scoresby subsequently noted that by 1598 they 
were involved in hunting whales off Iceland and near the North Cape of Norway.28 In 
reality much of the interest and activity of the Hull men in northern waters during these 
years lay in walrus hunting; whale products which were landed in the port were probably 
acquired through the medium of trade.
The activities of the Dutch appear to have revived the interest of the Muscovy 
Company in the exploration and exploitation of the Arctic. Bear Island was found by an 
expedition sent out by Francis Cherry, a prominent member of the Company, in 1603.29 
27 Vaughan,  The Arctic,  79;  Edward Gillett  and Kenneth A.  MacMahon,  A History  of  Hull 
(Oxford, 1980), 144-5. Trinity House records contain evidence of voyages regularly during 
the 1580s and 1590s,  see Brooks,  Miscellanea, 2,  4-6,  8-9,  11.  Victoria County History,  
Yorkshire East Riding (London, 1969), 1: 135-6. (Hereafter cited as V.C.H.). Some of these 
vessels may have carried fairly small cargoes, T.S. Willan,  The Early History of the Russia 
Company  1553-1603 (Manchester,  1956,  repr.;  New York,  1968),  138-40.  On  trade  and 
shipping see also Ralph Davies, The Trade and Shipping of Hull 1500-1700 (East Yorkshire 
Local History Series, 17, 1964), 10-12, 22-23. Later evidence, discussed below, indicates the 
involvement of York merchants in some of this northern enterprise, though their precise role 
is  difficult  to  determine.  Relations  between  Hull  and  York  were  close,  but  occasionally 
difficult.
28 Scoresby has been used by historians as the starting date of Hull whaling, but he provided no 
evidence to back up his claim. William Scoresby,  An Account of the Arctic Regions with a  
History and Description of the Northern Whale-Fishery, 2 vols. (Edinburgh & London, 1820, 
repr.;  Newton Abbot, 1969), 2: 20,124. Although Henry Elking,  A View of the Greenland 
Trade and Whale-Fishery (London, 1722), 41 claimed that the English whaling trade began 
in 1598, he did not identify the Hull men as being involved in the trade. Ralph Davis,  The 
Trade and Shipping of Hull, 6, 11-12.
29 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 11; Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement:  
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Known to the English as Cherry Island, the local walrus fishery was subject to rapid 
exploitation by Cherry’s vessels. The commercial potential of the trade also attracted the 
interest of Hull merchants and mariners, some of whom were irregularly employed by 
members of the Company. William Gourden of Hull served as the factor aboard Cherry’s 
expedition  of  1603.30 But  the  presence  of  competing  interests  at  Cherry  Island  was 
unwelcome to leading figures in the Company. In 1609, after a clash between the two 
sides,  the  Company formally  asserted  its  right  to  the  island.  After  several  years  of 
intensive  hunting,  however,  this  seems  to  have  been  a  hollow gesture.  By 1609 the 
scarcity of walruses apparently “made the Companie look out for further Discoveries.”31 
Some vessels from Hull continued to visit  the island.  In 1610, for example, William 
Gourden was hired by Thomas Swanne, to serve aboard the Patience,  “as spokesman for 
Russia or  pilot  for  Cherrie Yland,” though he refused to sail,  allegedly,  because of a 
subsequent agreement to go on another voyage for Robert Coldcoale.32
The Company’s search for new discoveries included Spitsbergen which Henry 
Hudson sighted during the course of an expedition in 1607 to reconnoitre a polar route to 
the  South  Sea.33 Two  years  later  Thomas  Marmaduke  of  Hull  may  have  been  at 
Spitsbergen  in  search  of  new walrus  hunting  grounds.  Thomas  Anderson,  a  whaling 
master from Hull, later claimed that Marmaduke discovered Spitsbergen in 1609, after 
failing to find any walruses at Bear Island. Marmaduke returned in 1611  “to Kill Sea 
Horse, but killed no Whale,” when he reportedly  “went all alonge the Coast”.34 These 
voyages, based on a combination of fishing and exploration, gave the Hull men a prior 
claim to the discovery of Spitsbergen which was used thereafter during their dispute with 
the Muscovy Company.  However,  Marmaduke’s  ventures were accompanied by more 
ambitious expeditions sent out by the Company, including one led by Jonas Poole in 1610 
which explored the west coast of Spitsbergen, and led to the naming of Bell Sound and 
Ice Sound.35 The following year the Company despatched its first whaling venture to the 
region, assisted by six Basque harpooners. The venture nearly ended in disaster when the 
two vessels set out by the Company were shipwrecked off Spitsbergen. The Company’s 
men  and  possessions  were  rescued  by  the  Fortune of  Hull,  under  the  command  of 
Marmaduke, who had “spent all the yeere in Horne Sound, and got little goods.”36 His 
lack of success was offset partly by the rescue of the Muscovy Company’s goods, for 
Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge, 1984), 
341-2.
30 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 291 includes an account by Gourden (or Gorden) of the 
voyage. V.C.H., 1: 136.
31 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13:.11; Conway, No Man’s Land, 31.
32 Brooks (ed.), Miscellanea, 25; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 20-1, 194, 281-4.
33 Sir  Martin  Conway,  “Hudson’s  Voyage  to  Spitsbergen  in  1607,”  Geographical  Journal, 
15(1900),  121-30.
34 Anderson appeared as a witness for Great Yarmouth during a dispute with the Greenland 
Company in April 1643. TNA, State Papers, 16/497/68. (Hereafter cited as S.P.).
35 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13:11-12; Sir Clements R. Markham, The Lands of Silence:  
A History of Arctic and Antarctic Exploration (Cambridge, 1921), 123-4.
36 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 14-15; Conway, No Man’s Land, 46-8.
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which he subsequently claimed compensation at  £5 per  ton,  and by the discovery of 
Trinity Island to the south west of Spitsbergen; known also as Jan Mayen Island, it was 
soon being used as a walrus and whale hunting station by vessels from Hull.
Looking back from the vantage point of the early 1630s, Sir William Monson 
claimed that  English whaling at  Spitsbergen,  under  the  instruction of the  Biscayners, 
“hath  been  discovered  and  prosecuted  with  little  charge  and  great  profit  to  the 
merchant.”37 Indeed the arrival of competing English interests at Spitsbergen inaugurated 
a boom in the trade which had far-reaching consequences. When Marmaduke returned to 
Spitsbergen in 1612, possibly sailing as far as 82° north in a reconnaissance of the region, 
there were at  least  five other vessels  engaged in hunting whales,  including one from 
Holland, another from the Spanish port of San Sebastian, and two from London set out by 
the Company.38 In these circumstances Marmaduke’s men attempted to secure a stake in 
the new trade by symbolically setting up a cross, with the royal standard attached to it, on 
part of the shore known as Red Beach. Evidence of fires made by the Hull men on the 
beach  was  found by a  Muscovy Company expedition  in  1614.  Robert  Fotherby,  the 
author of an account of this voyage, also described how a party of Hull mariners restored 
a cross “which… they found there fallen downe, and had been formerly set up, in the 
time of Master Marmadukes first discovery, by one Lawrence Prestwood, … with two or 
three names more, and it  had the date of  the seventeenth of August  1612. Upon this 
crosse they nailed the Kings armes.”39 No evidence survives of the Hull men’s returns for 
1612, though the Company seems to have experienced a profitable whaling season. It 
sent out two vessels, with crews of 100 men including Biscayners, at a charge of between 
£3,000  and  £4,000.  This  was  a  substantial  investment  in  a  new venture,  but  it  was 
reported later in the year that the expedition “prospered strangely, got within nine degrees 
of the pole, saw 700 whales, and brought home 17.”40
In 1613 at least seven Dutch vessels, and eight from San Sebastián, were engaged 
in whaling at Spitsbergen. The Company, which received a new charter during the year 
giving  it  exclusive  rights  to  fishing  in  the  region,  set  out  a  fleet  of  seven  vessels, 
including a well-armed ship of 260 tons with 21 ordnance. This armament enabled the 
Company’s ships to expel the Dutch, Spanish and French, while claiming the land, which 
was  ceremoniously  named  “King  James  his  New  Land.”41 The  vice-admiral  of  the 
expedition was Marmaduke, who was emerging as one of the most experienced ship-
masters involved in Arctic venturing. William Baffin, who served as chief pilot during the 
voyage, later recounted that Marmaduke was reprimanded for his eagerness to explore 
37 M. Oppenheim (ed.),  The  Naval  Tracts  of  Sir  William  Monson,  5  vols.  (Navy Records 
Society, 1902-14), 3: 236.
38 Purchas,  Hakluytus  Posthumus,  13:  15;  Markham,  Lands  of  Silence,  124;  Sir  W. Martin 
Conway (ed.),  Early Dutch and English Voyages to Spitsbergen in the Seventeenth Century 
(Hakluyt Society, 2nd Series, 11, 1904), 4-5; Hugh Calvert, A History of Kingston upon Hull 
(Chichester, 1978), 145.
39 Fotherby may have come from Grimsby. Markham, Voyages of William Baffin, 80, 93.
40 Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1611-18, 140. (Hereafter cited as C.S.P.D.).
41 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 15.
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the area, allegedly to the hindrance of its primary purpose. Nonetheless the Company’s 
vessels killed 38 whales, and Marmaduke’s ship returned with an impressive lading of 
184  tons  of  oil  and  5,000  pounds  of  whale-bone.42 While  the  English  reported  an 
abundance of whales and walruses at Spitsbergen, they were unable to kill too many of 
the  latter.  The  Company’s  returns  for  1613 reinforced  a  growing appreciation of  the 
economic potential of the trade, despite the danger of a dispute with the Dutch: “The 
profit is very rich,” Sir John Throckmorton reported in October 1613, “and 2 or 3 of our 
London ships lately come from thence approve the same.”43 
The Muscovy Company sought to strengthen its claim to the Spitsbergen trade 
through  politics  and  diplomacy.  Thus  the  Dutch  claim  to  prior  discovery,  based  on 
Barents’ voyage of 1596, was challenged on the grounds that Sir Hugh Willoughby had 
discovered  Spitsbergen  in  1553.  The  Dutch,  according  to  this  view,  were  merely 
following in the footsteps of the Company. Moreover the Company insisted that it began 
the whaling trade at Spitsbergen during 1611: “This trade of whale fishing being thus 
discouvered, begunne, & Continued by the Merchants, they houlde it proper, & peculiar 
to themselves, aswell bye naturall rights & intereste as by President, & Example of other 
Nations.”44 In 1614 the Dutch ambassador in London and the governor of the Company 
debated  the  issue  before  the  Privy Council.  According  to  the  English  record,  it  was 
“evidently  proved,  and  in  a  manner  without  contradiction,  that  …  (they)  were  first 
discoverers of that navigation and that trade of fishing: that privately they were possessed 
of  that  island,  and  there  had planted and erected  … (the  royal)  standard,  thereby to 
signify and notify to the world the property.”45 In practice the Company’s  claim was 
theoretical and unenforceable. But the parties to this dispute were more concerned with 
access and utility than with actual possession; essentially this involved control over the 
bays and harbours at Spitsbergen, and the unrestricted use of the shore as a base for the 
processing of whale blubber. Despite the prospect of conflict between the English and 
Dutch  at  Spitsbergen,  a  concern  to  “conserve  mutual  correspondence”  favoured 
compromise  in  London.46 Anglo-Dutch  rivalry  over  the  whaling  trade  persisted, 
occasionally flaring into open conflict, but it was gradually defused by a demarcation of 
separate spheres of interest at Spitsbergen. Faced with the prospect of English hostility in 
the bays and harbours of the south-west, the Dutch turned their attention to the northern 
coasts  of  the  archipelago.  Although  this  unwritten  agreement  failed  to  protect  the 
Company from the damaging impact of Dutch competition, as late as 1654 several Dutch 
vessels were reportedly reluctant to sail into Duck’s Cove at Spitsbergen because it was 
42 Markham, Voyages of William Baffin, 49-50, 63.
43 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Downshire, 4: 214.
44 “A Briefe Narration of the discoveries of the Northern seas: to approve his Majesties right to 
Greenland written in anno 1613,” in The New World: A Catalogue of an Exhibition of Books,  
Maps, Manuscripts and Documents (London, 1957), 87; Vaughan, The Arctic, 81-2.
45 Letters  From and To Sir  Dudley  Carleton,  Knt.  During  His  Embassy  in  Holland,  From 
January 1615/16 to December 1620 (London, 1775), 6-7.
46 Letters From and To Sir Dudley Carleton, 7; British Library, London, Yelverton MS. 48155, 
ff. 40-41v.
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recognized as an English harbour.47
After  a  prolonged and  uneasy gestation,  the  English  whaling  trade  was  born 
during the  early seventeenth century.  It  depended on the  opening up of  rich hunting 
grounds off Spitsbergen, encouraged by the competition between the Muscovy Company 
and the Hull men which cut across the international rivalry between the English, Dutch, 
Spanish  and  French.  It  was  also  subject  to  the  acquisition  of  new  skills,  and  the 
development  of  carefully timed patterns  of  voyaging,  aimed at  exploiting the narrow 
opportunity of the short Arctic summer, when the ice about Spitsbergen melted. Although 
the employment  of  experienced Basque whalemen,  who served as  harpooners  aboard 
ships sent out by the Muscovy Company, was an essential part of this learning process, 
the situation in provincial  ports,  like Hull,  appears to have been different.48 There is, 
indeed, scant evidence for the presence of the Basques aboard Hull vessels. Local masters 
and mariners who were engaged in the whaling trade may have acquired some of their 
skills through the agency of men, such as Marmaduke, who were occasionally employed 
by the  Company;  others  may have  been  forced  to  proceed  with  the  uncertainties  of 
improvisation.  Even  for  the  Basques,  the  Spitsbergen  trade  in  the  early  seventeenth 
century was new, the development of  which rested to some extent  on trial  and error. 
Under these conditions the rapid growth of English whaling may have been imperceptibly 
aided by a common perception that it was a form of fishing. The Muscovy Company 
captured the essence of this view in its comment on “The nature of this Fishinge being 
rather a hunting by armed Men above water, then a fishing under water”.49 In the later 
1620s,  when the Hull  men defended their  right  to participate in the whaling trade at 
Spitsbergen, against the exclusive claims of the Company, they did so on the grounds 
“that they live at sea and are fishers.”50 In effect English whaling started life as a fishing 
trade, with finely-balanced opportunities for its future development.
It was within this context that Hull merchants and mariners sought to develop the 
trade  of  Arctic  whaling.  Although  the  evidence  is  often  confusing  and  contentious, 
reflecting the controversies that surrounded the emergence of the English trade, it is clear 
that Hull ships were among some of the earliest vessels to visit Spitsbergen and Trinity 
Island for a commercial purpose. A memorandum drawn up in 1617, defending the right 
of the Hull men to hunt whales in the northern seas, linked this with difficulties in the 
fishing trade at Vardø. Thus “Maryners of Hull with their Shipps (to their great chardge) 
did first  discover manie profitable Ilandes about Greneland when they were expulsed 
frome their fishinge at Wardehowse, where before they had good employment for viii or 
x shipps yearlie.”51 This appears to refer to the arrest of five Hull vessels fishing off 
47 Markham, Lands of Silence, 127; Conway, No Man’s Land, 135.
48 Markham,  Voyages of William Baffin,  59 where the Basques are described as “our whale 
strikers.”
49 S.P. 18/65/62.
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Vardø during 1599, at  the order of the King of Denmark.52 In response the Hull men 
began to  search for  alternative  fishing grounds and suitable  sites  for  walrus  hunting. 
Evidently much of this maritime probing, which paved the way for Hull’s entry into the 
whaling trade, was obscure and unrecorded. Furthermore the customs records for the port 
during the first two decades of the seventeenth century only survive for 1602/3, 1608/9, 
1613/14 and 1618/19. These accounts provide no evidence of whaling activity prior to 
1613, though the judgements of Hull Trinity House indicate that at least one vessel, the 
Phoenix, was involved in a whaling voyage to Spitsbergen during the year.53 Thereafter 
the customs evidence indicates the landing of  whale-bone from the “northe parts”  in 
1614,  and  of  whale  oil  from Trinity Island  during  1619.54 In  association  with  other 
evidence, therefore, it can be argued that the Hull men turned to Arctic whaling sometime 
between 1612 and 1619; that this development grew out of their interests in fishing and 
walrus hunting; and that it was focused on Trinity Island, Spitsbergen and Edge Island to 
the east.55
3. Competition and conflict with the Muscovy Company
The  rapid  growth  of  the  English  whaling  trade  during  the  early  seventeenth 
century placed the merchants and mariners of Hull on a collision course with their rivals 
in the Muscovy Company. At the outset this appears to have been an unbalanced struggle 
between a powerful London company, the governor of which, Sir Thomas Smith, was one 
of the most prominent and well-connected merchants in the city, and a small group of 
little known, almost anonymous, provincial traders. But the Hull men pursued their case 
with  great  tenacity,  earning  a  reputation  as  the  most  troublesome  of  the  Company’s 
opponents.56 After years of unresolved competition and occasional conflict their right to 
participate in the whaling trade at Spitsbergen, as well as their claim to Trinity Island, 
was officially recognized by the Privy Council. This did little, however, to deal with the 
underlying  issue  concerning  access  to  the  bays  and  harbours  of  Spitsbergen,  which 
remained a source of tension between the Company and provincial traders through to the 
1640s and 1650s.
During the early decades of the seventeenth century the Company aggressively 
defended its charter, in an effort to protect its monopoly over English enterprise in Arctic 
52 V.C.H., 1: 136.
53 Brooks, Miscellanea, 30.
54 The  Phoenix and the  Seabright returned with 7 and 5 tons of train oil during September 
1614; the Grace and the Heartsease returned from Trinity Island with ladings of whale oil, 
walrus bone and hides. TNA, Port Books E.190/313/8 and 190/314/14.
55 Conway,  No Man’s Land, 102-3, 126, 129, 364-5 argues that the Hull men frequented the 
eastern region,  seldom coming into contact  with the Company’s  men, during these early 
years. Duck’s (or Duke’s) Cove on Edge Island may have been named after Marmaduke. 
However the evidence from Purchas indicates that some Hull vessels were visiting the bays 
of western Spitsbergen; and Bottle Cove, in Bell Sound, was soon to become their main 
whaling station.
56 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 19-20, 33-4, 284.
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regions. In March 1613 these rights were confirmed by the crown: Spitsbergen,  Bear 
Island  and  other  islands  in  the  north  were  explicitly  identified  as  coming  within  its 
jurisdiction.  They  appeared  to  be  reinforced  by  proclamations  of  1614  and  1619, 
restricting the import of whale-bone to the Company, and of 1636 which included oil.57 
Determined to assert its authority over the new trade, during the whaling season of 1613 
an expedition sent out by the Company forced other vessels, including four English ships, 
to leave Spitsbergen. Diplomatic complaints by the Dutch were met with the claim of 
prior discovery by the English. Claiming a right of  jure domini, which was intended to 
support the jurisdiction of the Company, the Privy Council insisted that “it is not lawfull 
for  any other  of  his  Majestie’s  subjectes,  much lesse  for  strangers,  to  fishe or  abide 
there.”58 But the Company’s action invited retaliation. In 1614 the House of Commons 
was informed that the Dutch “have sent an army to force a trade in Greenland in despite 
of the English”.59 At the same time the Hull men seem to have been in the process of 
bringing  their  complaints  against  the  Company  before  the  Commons.  The  sudden 
dissolution of parliament meant that the “Hull business” was not heard, but the possibility 
of using it as a forum for provincial grievances was soon to be revived.60
Although the Company continued its ambitious attempts to develop the whaling 
trade at Spitsbergen, it was forced to send out large expeditions, accompanied by at least 
one well-armed vessel, in order to protect its interests. Little evidence survives of the 
activities of the Hull men during this difficult  period. According to Thomas Edge, an 
agent for the Company who wrote an account of English whaling at Spitsbergen, they 
“still  followed  the  steps  of  the  Londoners,  and  in  a  yeere  or  two  called  it  their 
Discovery”.61 In 1617 it was reported that “the Hull men set a small ship or two to the 
East-wards of Greenland,” possibly in search of new whaling grounds.62 At the end of 
September the Privy Council issued warrants for the arrest of Nicholas Gatonby, master 
of the Patience of Hull, and Robert Coldcoale, merchant, to answer allegations that they 
had infringed the Company’s jurisdiction at Spitsbergen. Both men appeared before the 
Council  on  10 October,  when a  committee  was  established to  examine  the  issues  in 
dispute between the two sides.63
The case for Hull was laid out in a carefully worded paper that was probably 
submitted to the committee in November 1617. It drew on a variety of arguments which 
tried to distinguish between the interests of the northern port and those of the Company, 
57 C.S.P.D.  1611-18,  178;  James  F.  Larkin  and  Paul  L.  Hughes  (eds.),  Stuart  Royal  
Proclamations. Volume 1: Royal Proclamations of King James I 1603-1625 (Oxford, 1973), 
315-6, 432-3.
58 Acts of the Privy Council 1613-14, 322. (Hereafter cited as A.P.C.).
59 Maija Jansson (ed.), Proceedings in Parliament 1614 (House of Commons) (Memoirs of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 172)(Philadelphia, 1988), 430.
60 Jansson, Proceedings in Parliament 1614, 382, 401.
61 Purchas,  Hakluytus Posthumus,  13: 19-20. Though it  is possible that under Marmaduke’s 
leadership some of the Hull men were exploring farther east. Conway, No Man’s Land, 31-2.
62 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 13: 19-20.
63 A.P.C. 1616-17, 329-30, 341-2, 344.
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while drawing attention to the importance of the whaling trade for the local and regional 
economy. Not only were mariners from Hull the first  to discover many islands about 
Spitsbergen,  but  also “the places where Hull  shipps take the whale was never in the 
actuall possession of … (the) Companie, but 80 or 90 Myles distant from anie contynent 
or Island granted by Charter” to it.64 In addition it was claimed that the Hull men had 
been  involved  in  the  trade  for  as  long  as  the  Company.  Moreover,  while  the  latter 
attempted to restrict English whaling, the Dutch and others continued to visit Spitsbergen 
without hindrance. In an attempt to forestall concern at the impact of competition on the 
domestic market for whale products, it was pointed out that the Hull men disposed of 
their  oil  in  the  north;  any  surplus  was  usually  exported  without  prejudice  to  the 
Company’s interests. Finally the paper drew attention to the growing significance of the 
whaling trade, and its widespread economic and social ramifications. Between 200 and 
300 householders  were  investors  in  a planned whaling venture,  at  a  charge of  about 
£3,000.  If  the  voyage was restrained,  at  the  request  of  the  Company,  they would be 
utterly undone; and the damage might  be even wider.  By the “meanes of this voiage 
onelie,  … most  of  the Artificers are employed of the whole towne, as Bearebrewers, 
Coopers, Smythes, Bakers, Butchers, Taylors, Shewmakers, Ropemakers &c. As are also 
besyde a great nomber of seamen and maryners, above 100 landmen who being cast out 
of  their  rurall  service in respect  of  the great  povertie latelie falne upon the Countree 
might  sterve if  they should want  this  employment.”65 This was a skilful  presentation 
which may have been intended to serve several purposes. While it provided a justification 
for  Hull’s  right  to  participate  in  the  whaling  trade,  by  not  directly  challenging  the 
Company’s claim to Spitsbergen it seemed to leave the door open for negotiation and 
compromise.
The Company, however, was unwilling to give ground. By the terms of its charter 
the Hull men, and any others who were involved in the Spitsbergen trade without the 
Company’s approval,  were interlopers whose activities threatened the development of 
English whaling. In January 1618 the Company warned that if the problem was not dealt 
with,  the trade would be overthrown. The merchants and mariners of  Hull  were also 
identified as the “most troublesome, and the greatest hinderers of the Companie”.66 While 
it was forced to despatch large expeditions to Spitsbergen, their northern rivals were able 
to  set  out  “smale  vessells  att  little  Charge  …  and  under  sell”  the  Company  in  the 
domestic  market.67 The  Privy  Council  attempted  to  resolve  the  dispute  through 
negotiation. Although the Company offered to “admit  the Hull  men … into the joynt 
stocke  …  for  the  fishing  of  the  whale  without  clogging  them  with  any  charge  or 
inconvenience incident to the trade of Russia, … on the other side those of Hull … doe 
rather desire the … Company may come into joynt stocke with them of the coast townes, 
wherein they soe persist that neither partie will by any reason or perswasion be drawne to 
64 S.P. 14/94/71.
65 S.P. 14/94/71.
66 British Library, London, Lansdowne MS. 142, f.390; A.P.C. 1618-19, 2, 40-41.
67 British Library, London, Lansdowne MS. 142, f.389v.
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other conformitie.”68
With  the  prospect  of  a  mutually  acceptable  agreement  receding,  and  a  new 
whaling  season approaching,  the  Council  resorted  to  the  expediency of  a  short  term 
solution.  In  doing  so,  it  acknowledged  that  Trinity  Island  “was  first  possessed  and 
frequented” by the Hull men, and “consequently the fishing of the whale at that island 
and all  other  comodities  of  that  place  doth by … right  of  discovery appertaine  unto 
them”.69 The council’s intervention enabled the merchants of Hull and King’s Lynn, who 
evidently  represented  the  interests  of  the  coast  towns,  to  set  out  up  to  300  tons  of 
shipping to hunt whales at Trinity Island, on condition that any whale-bone brought back 
to England would be exported.70
Even this temporary agreement failed to work effectively. Although the Hull men 
seem to have stayed away from Spitsbergen in 1618, the Company alleged that Thomas 
Marmaduke,  who  was  fishing  off  Cherry Island,  persuaded several  Dutch  vessels  to 
attack its ships in Bell Sound. In reality the Dutch needed little incentive or justification 
for hostile action against the English. They also appear to have clashed with the Hull men 
at Trinity Island, which they named and claimed as Jan Mayen Island on the grounds of 
prior discovery. The following year the Company was faced with the prospect of renewed 
competition along the west coast of Spitsbergen with some of the Hull men, who seem to 
have been in the process of abandoning whale hunting at Edge Island and Trinity Island. 
In 1619 Marmaduke was whaling in Horn Sound, though he lost two shallops and six 
men, while his own vessel was seriously damaged by the ice.71 Thereafter Hull ships 
began to use Bottle Cove, on the northern shore of Bell  Sound, as a regular whaling 
station, in a region that was coveted by the Company.
Faced with such mounting difficulties, the Company began to lose interest in the 
whaling trade. In 1618 it claimed losses of more than  £66,000 against the Dutch.72 By 
1620 it is likely that less than a handful of members of the Company remained involved 
in the trade. During the early 1620s it farmed out the whaling trade to a small group of 
members,  led by Ralph Freeman,  a  leading London merchant  who had wide ranging 
commercial  and  shipping  interests.73 The  new organization,  known as  the  Greenland 
Company,  inherited the dispute  with the  Hull  men.  Seeking to take advantage of  the 
Company’s difficulties, the latter were prepared to resort to more overt means of political 
68 A.P.C. 1618-19,  46.
69 A.P.C.  1618-19,  2,  40-41,  46.  The discovery of Jan Mayen Island was bitterly contested 
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70 A.P.C. 1618-19, 46.
71 Conway, No Man’s Land, 32, 126.
72 C.S.P.D. 1611-18, 572-3.
73 Maurice Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate (2nd 
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lobbying  to  advance  their  case.  During  the  parliament  of  1621,  when  a  bill  for  the 
freedom of fishing on the coasts of North America was being discussed, John Lister, M.P. 
for Hull, with the support of Sir Thomas Wentworth, the member for Yorkshire, urged 
that Spitsbergen be included.74
Although these tactics bore little immediate fruit, evidently some of the Hull men 
were preparing for a confrontation with the Londoners. Early in 1623 the Privy Council 
was informed that Nicholas Gatonby, Thomas Anderson and Richard Warner, with others 
of Hull, “have given out that they are resolved and doe intend to make a voyage this 
yeare from thence to Greeneland with diverse shipps, purposing to encroach and enter 
upon  the  … companie’s  discoveries  and  privileges  and  thereof  make  great  boast  in 
London.”75 On 4 April  1623 the council  ordered the mayor  of  Hull  to take bonds of 
£1,000 from several masters, in an effort to prevent them from sailing to Spitsbergen or 
the islands to the east. The council’s instructions provoked an unyielding response from 
the mayor and customs officials in the port. Claiming to speak for “the bodye of this 
whole towne, and manie of the countrie adjoyninge,” these local office-holders warned 
the council that “the Restrainte of their tradinge thither conserneth no lesse then the utter 
ruyne not onelie of  them, their wives,  and children,  but  of  a nomber of  people more 
interessed in that voiedge, for that they now have to their great chardges prepared & 
Addressed themselves with three or foure small shipps of purpose to have traded this 
yeare (as for manie other yeares they formerlie have done) into those partes, whereof (as 
they affirme) they can well prove themselves to have beene the first discoverers.”76
Prompted by local concerns the council again resorted to compromise, presenting 
various propositions to the members of the Greenland Company for the conduct of the 
forthcoming whaling season. No details of these proposals survive, but later evidence 
suggests that the Company agreed to allow a specified volume of Hull ships to participate 
in the trade, possibly at a carefully selected location at Spitsbergen. The following year 
the Company allowed the Hull men to hunt for whales in Duck’s Cove. In 1625, however, 
they were excluded from Spitsbergen by a fleet sent out by the Company. Boats and other 
equipment left in Duck’s Cove in 1624 were also seized.77
The Hull men responded by sending out a large expedition to Spitsbergen during 
1626, possibly with the intention of provoking a conflict with the Company’s vessels. 
Early in  June the  Company’s  fleet,  under the  command of captain William Goodlad, 
arrived at  Spitsbergen.  Unaware of the presence of their  rivals  from Hull  the vessels 
separated,  sailing  to  their  appointed  harbours  along  the  coast.  Goodlad,  aboard  the 
admiral of the expedition, the Hercules, a well-armed man-of-war, carrying 22 ordnance, 
stayed close to the ice in Bell Sound, probably to provide protection for the other vessels 
74 Wallace Notestein, Frances Helen Relf, Hartley Simpson (eds.), Commons Debates 1621, 7 
vols. (New Haven, 1935),  2:  386, 297-8. L.M. Stanewell (ed.),  Calendar of the Ancient  
Deeds,  Letters,  Miscellaneous  Old  Documents,  &c.  in  the  Archives  of  the  Corporation 
(Kingston-upon-Hull, 1951), 177.
75 A.P.C. 1621-23, 459; Stanewell, Calendar, 180-1.
76 S.P. 14/143/10.
77 Conway, Early Dutch and English Voyages to Spitsbergen, 175.
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in nearby bays. Towards the end of June he sailed to Whale Head harbour, where he met 
several Hull ships which “had killed some whales there and boyled them,” in defiance of 
the Company’s claim over the region.78 Goodlad also alleged that some of the Hull men 
seized and spoiled provisions left ashore by a previous expedition. These included eleven 
or twelve shallops and several oil coolers.79 In Duck’s Cove houses and  “the forte and 
platforme of a fortificacion or Castle,” which had been transported to Spitsbergen by the 
Company’s vessels during 1624 and 1625, were “razed and spoiled.”80 In a neighbouring 
bay Goodlad encountered a fleet of nine ships from Hull and York; when he demanded 
satisfaction for the damage to the Company’s property, they prepared to attack his vessel.
According  to  Goodlad’s  account  of  the  ensuing  clash,  based  partly  on 
information received from several of the Hull men, when they sighted the  Hercules the 
masters  of  the  northern  ships  “called  a  Councell  toucheinge  the  …  choice  of  their 
Admirall and Rear Admirall, and not agreeing caste the dice for the same, and soe it fell 
to  (Richard)  Prestwood  to  bee  Admirall  and  (Richard)  Perkins  Rear  Admirall.”81 A 
confusing and hotly disputed exchange of shots led to a skirmish between the two sides 
that lasted for about two hours, after which the Hull ships yielded. Although Thomas 
Anderson and Jeremy Gascoigne, two of the Hull masters, informed Goodlad “that all the 
Masters … had bounde themselves, one to the other to fighte againste” the Londoners, 
Prestwood “had threatened to sue the bonds of them … because they would not fighte”.82 
After  yielding,  the Hull  ships were forced to leave Spitsbergen, mid-way through the 
whaling season. They returned home with about 162 tons of oil and 200 tons of blubber. 
The oil was estimated to be worth £15 a ton, the blubber was worth £8 a ton. Goodlad 
noted that this was about  “a thirde parte of  their ladeinge, wheras there were whales 
enoughe there to have laded both the Hull and Yorke shippes and Londoners, had they not 
disagreed”.83 He also claimed that the Company suffered losses of between £7,000 and 
£10,000 as a result of the hostility of the Hull men.
On their return Perkins and Prestwood were ordered to appear before the Privy 
Council;  they  were  discharged  on  15  November,  following  the  establishment  of  a 
committee to examine and settle the dispute. Later in the year representatives of both 
sides appeared before the committee to debate the future of  the trade.  The Company 
restated its exclusive rights over whaling at Spitsbergen and Cherry Island, as well as 
over islands yet to be discovered in the region. But this was disputed by the northern 
merchants on the grounds that “in point of lawe the King had not devested himselfe unto 
them of the sole fishing of those parts,  to the exclusion of himselfe and all  his other 
78 C.S.P.D. 1625-26, 475. TNA, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, William Goodlad, 19 
April  1627,  H.C.A.  13/46,  ff.78v-82.  Joan  Thirsk  and  J.P.  Cooper  (eds.),  Seventeenth-
Century Economic Documents (Oxford, 1972), 479-80.
79 TNA, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, H.C.A. 13/46, ff.79-81; S.P. 16/39/67.
80 TNA, Kew, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 79-80.
81 Ibid., ff. 79v-80.
82 Ibid., ff. 79v-80.
83 Ibid., ff. 80v-82.
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subjects for ever.”84 Following further discussion with the attorney-general a temporary 
agreement was reached in January 1627 which was to last  for  one year.  Drawing on 
previous  arrangements,  it  was  agreed that  the  merchants  of  Hull  and York would be 
allowed to send out 600 tons of shipping to Spitsbergen, out of a total of 3,000 tons, on 
condition  that  they paid  a  fifth  part  of  the  Greenland Company’s  farm of  the  trade. 
Though temporary, the Privy Council hoped that it would lead to a long term settlement 
by encouraging “the parties to adventure in a joint stock according to their proporcions, it 
being … the readiest way to bring the businesse to a full accommodation”.85 With this 
aim in view, the Council  attempted to enforce the agreement during 1627. In April  it 
issued instructions to prevent any vessels leaving Great Yarmouth for Spitsbergen. The 
following month it ordered the mayor of Hull to stop the Primrose from departing on a 
whaling voyage,  because it  exceeded the port’s  allocation of shipping.86 The mayor’s 
failure to prevent the  Primrose from sailing underlines the fragility of the agreement. 
Adam Marmaduke, the ship’s master, refused to allow the mayor’s agent aboard, leaving 
behind a new shallop, without which the mayor had assumed that the ship “could not well 
goe to sea, or at least make any voyage.”87
During 1628 the dispute concerning the privileges of the Greenland Company 
was investigated by parliament. Despite an English claim to Spitsbergen which allegedly 
reached back to King Arthur, and the availability of bays and harbours that were large 
enough for the English to exploit  peacefully,  competition between rival  interests  was 
threatening the ruin of the whaling trade: “while we have differed thus”, members of the 
House of Commons were informed, “the Hollanders have beat us all out.”88 In May 1628 
the  complaints  of  the  Hull  men,  which linked local  grievances  with wider  economic 
concerns, were heard by the Committee of Grievances. The clash with the Company’s 
vessels in 1626 was presented as an unprovoked attack, during which two members of the 
Hull fleet lost their arms.89 At the same time, while the Company was trying to exclude 
the  Hull  men  from whaling  at  Spitsbergen,  Dutch  and  Scottish  vessels  hunted  there 
without restraint. The Company’s privileged position, moreover, was damaging to trade 
and the domestic market. According to the Hull men, the Company’s control of the trade 
enabled it to “let … (oil) go at what price they please.”90 Consequently the price of oil 
had increased from £12 to £24 a ton in recent years.
The Greenland Company’s attempt to defend its privileges was weakened by an 
acknowledgement of the Committee of Grievances that Trinity Island was discovered by 
the  Hull  men  in  1609.  It  was  also  confused  by Sir  Thomas  Wentworth’s  claim that 
84 A.P.C. 1626, 305-351, 367-8, 395.
85 A.P.C. 1627, 14; C.S.P.D. 1627-28, 10, 113.
86 A.P.C. 1627, 199-200, 273-4.
87 S.P. 16/64/58.
88 Robert C. Johnson et al. (eds.),  Commons Debates 1628, 6 vols. (New Haven & London, 
1977-83), 3: 433-5.
89 Ibid., 343-4.
90 Ibid., 343-4, 433.
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Spitsbergen  had  been  found  by  them “as  soon  as  the  Muscovy Company.”91 While 
speaking as  one of  the  members  for  Yorkshire,  who was representing local  interests, 
Wentworth’s  growing  authority  in  the  Commons  meant  that  his  statement,  though 
contentious, could not be lightly dismissed. Indeed it appeared to set the tone for the 
Committee’s discussion of the Company’s  case.  Sir Edward Coke,  a former attorney-
general and lord chancellor, asserted that parts of its patent were void.92 Sir Nathaniel 
Rich, a prominent London merchant with wide ranging interests in transatlantic trade and 
colonization,  urged the  Company “to  let  the  shipping (be)  open,”  warning that  if  its 
“patents proved bad,” then it would have to pay compensation to the Hull men.93 In this 
unfavourable  atmosphere  it  was  reported  that  the  Muscovy Company was  willing  to 
transfer the whaling trade into the hands of the latter, on the condition that they “would 
undertake to defend and maintain that  fishing against  strangers …; but  those of  Hull 
refused to undertake the same.”94 After further discussion the Committee resorted to a 
short term compromise, based on previous agreements, which would allow “those of Hull 
… to send this year 500 ton of shipping to that fishing.”95 However this did not prevent it 
from reporting, later in the year, that the Company’s monopoly over the whaling trade at 
Spitsbergen was a grievance. In June it was agreed that a petition to this effect should be 
drawn up by a group of MPs, and presented to the king.96
The Company survived this attack on its privileges, but by the later 1620s it was 
evident  that  the  dispute  with  Hull  was  only serving  to  benefit  overseas  competitors, 
particularly  the  Dutch.  In  such  circumstances  both  sides  appear  to  have  reached  an 
agreement that enabled the Hull men to participate in the whaling trade in association 
with,  or  under  the  auspices  of,  the  Company.  No  direct  evidence  survives  for  this 
arrangement, but the surviving customs records for Hull during the period from 1629 to 
1640 indicate that ships returning from Spitsbergen, with ladings of oil and bone, were 
entered for the Greenland Company.97 It seems likely therefore that the Hull men were 
either leasing or sharing a proportion of the trade with their former rivals in London. 
While the Company continued to complain to the Privy Council during the 1630s about 
the activities of interlopers from Great Yarmouth, its competition with Hull appeared to 
be over.
4. The consolidation and character of a new trade
During the 1620s and 1630s the whaling trade became a regular part of Hull’s 
91 Ibid., 616, 619.
92 Ibid., 610, 616.
93 Ibid., 616, 619.
94 Ibid., 619-20.
95 Ibid., 611, 620.
96 Ibid., 467-8, 474, 476.
97 TNA, Port Books, E. 190/316/12; 190/317/6; 190/318/1A. In March 1635 the Privy Council 
instructed that Nathaniel Edwards be admitted to the trade of the Greenland Company “upon 
lyke condicons as the Marchants of the Citie of York, and the Towne of Kingston upon Hull 
are.” TNA, Privy Council Registers, P.C. 2/44, ff. 503-4.
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commercial and maritime enterprise, attracting as many as nine vessels in some years. 
Local  interest  in  whaling  grew  out  of  the  northern  fishing  trade  at  Vardø  and  the 
surrounding region; in particular, it  represented an extension of walrus hunting which 
attracted  the  Hull  men  to  island  locations.  But  commercial  whaling  in  the  Arctic 
developed within a highly competitive environment that was international and national in 
scope. Although a provincial English port, such as Hull, may not have been in a strong 
position  to  cope  with  European  rivalry,  it  was  better  placed  to  deal  with  domestic 
competition from London whaling interests. Compared with their rivals in London, the 
Hull men had a head start for the voyage to Spitsbergen. Departing early in May, the Hull 
ships could be at Spitsbergen by the end of the month or early June, giving them an 
important advantage in the selection of bays for whale hunting. The surviving evidence, 
indeed, indicates that the Londoners sometimes arrived to find the Hull men on location 
and engaged in whaling, in areas that the Company struggled to protect from competing 
interests.98
Although geographical advantage facilitated the growth of the whaling trade in 
Hull,  the driving force behind its  development lay in the demand for whale products 
across an extensive and accessible hinterland. The merchants of Hull enjoyed unrestricted 
access to a widespread market for oil in northern England, through a far-reaching river 
network,  that  ranged  from the  soap  manufacturers  of  York  to  the  clothiers  of  West 
Yorkshire towns, such as Leeds and Wakefield.99 The expansion of the textile industry, 
which was reflected in an impressive increase in cloth exports from Hull to the Low 
Countries  during the 1620s and 1630s,  was probably vital  to  the maintenance of  the 
whaling trade, especially given the threat to the local manufacture of soap following the 
establishment of the Society of Soapers of Westminster in 1632: not only did the new 
Society close down the soapworks in York, it also sought to end the use of whale oil in 
the manufacture of soap.100 Although local and regional markets for whale-bone were 
smaller and more scattered, the growth of the cutlery trade in Sheffield created another 
outlet  for  whale  products  which  was  within  reach  of  Hull  by relatively cheap  river 
transport.
The surviving customs records for Hull, supplemented by other material, provide 
invaluable evidence for the development of the trade during the 1620s and 1630s. Table 1 
contains details of the number of vessels landing cargoes of whale oil and bone in Hull, 
with annual totals for both of the latter, based on these records. It also includes estimates, 
that must be viewed as notional, for the average volume of oil returned by each vessel, 
and for the number of whales killed at Spitsbergen or Trinity Island.
98 Purchas,  Hakluytus  Posthumus,  13:  14-15,  281-2;  TNA,  High  Court  of  Admiralty, 
Examinations, H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 78v-82.
99 On internal trade, see T.S. Willan, The Inland Trade: Studies in English Internal Trade in the  
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Manchester, 1976), 15-17.
100 Jackson, British Whaling Trade, 20-1.
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Table 1: Hull whaling vessels and cargoes, 1618-1640
1618/9 1622/3 1629/30 1630/1 1632/3 1633/4 1636/7 1639/40
Number of vessels 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 3
Amount of oil 1 65 264 275 327 315 163+ 131 187
Amount of bone 2 - - 3,900 5,000 3,700 - - 6,800
Estimated whales 3 3-6 13-22 14-23 16-27 16-26 8-14 6-11 9-16





Source: The National Archives Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter cited as TNA), Port Books 
E.190/314/14; 190/315/3; 190/316/10 & 12; 190/317/6 & 7; 190/318/1A& 7.
Although Hull  was  one  of  the  leading  centres  for  the  English  whaling  trade 
during the first half of the seventeenth century, the scale of enterprise in the port was 
modest. However interest in the trade was sustained during a difficult period, when the 
English struggled to meet the challenges of a new way of seafaring. To a considerable 
degree this  was a speculative  phase in  the development  of  the  whaling trade,  during 
which competing interests attempted to secure rapid profit from the exploitation of the 
marine  life  of  the  Arctic,  at  the  risk  of  endangering  the  resource  base  on  which  it 
depended. Thus the customs records for Hull strongly suggest that by the early 1620s its 
main interest in the Arctic was concentrated on whaling at Spitsbergen rather than Trinity 
Island.  According  to  William Scoresby  the  latter  was  abandoned  during  this  period 
because of the prodigious destruction of its whale and walrus populations due to over-
hunting.101 William Goodlad, one of the Greenland Company’s captains, indicated that 
prior to 1624 the Hull men used Bottle Cove as their base at Spitsbergen.102 Thereafter 
they extended their activities, visiting other bays and harbours usually within the confines 
of Bell Sound, which tended to be the resort of most English whaling vessels during these 
years. Within these surroundings the Hull men were involved in bay-whaling, which was 
distinct from the open-sea hunting that the Dutch developed during the 1640s and 1650s 
in response to the declining number of whales at Spitsbergen.103 
English whaling remained a specialized trade, restricted to a small number of 
ports, throughout the seventeenth century. In Hull, as the data in Table 1 suggest, at least 
four vessels were regularly engaged in the trade during the 1620s and 1630s. In some 
years the total was much greater; during 1626 there were nine vessels from Hull and York 
at  Spitsbergen,  forming a  substantial  complement  to  the other English ships.104 Little 
101 Scoresby, An Account of the Arctic Regions, 2: 54-5.
102 TNA,  High  Court  of  Admiralty,  Examinations,  William Goodlad,  19 April  1627,  H.C.A. 
13/46, ff. 78v-82; Conway,  No Man’s Land, 142; Calvert,  History of Kingston upon Hull, 
147.
103 Jenkins, History of the Whale Fisheries, 25-6 argues that the bay fishery at Spitsbergen was 
exhausted as early as 1623.
104 Conway, No Man’s Land, 142; S.P. 16/39/67.
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evidence survives for the type of shipping used in the whaling trade at this time, or of its 
tonnage, armament and manning. Many of the vessels were probably in the region of 
between 100 and 150 tons, sufficient to carry three or more shallops for use in whale 
hunting.105 Some were armed to a greater or lesser degree, but few were as well-equipped 
as vessels sent out by the Muscovy or Greenland Company. Among the Company’s fleet 
of  1626,  one vessel  carried 22 pieces  of  ordnance which were  apparently more than 
sufficient to compel the ships of Hull to yield.106 During this early phase of development 
most of the shipping involved in whaling was made up of unspecialized trading vessels, 
though a number may have been strengthened or modified in various ways as a defence 
against ice. Consequently the use of vessels for the whaling trade in Hull appears to have 
varied from year to year. During the seven years, from 1622 to 1640, for which customs 
records survive, between 16 and 19 vessels were entered from Spitsbergen; out of these 
totals about one quarter was recorded more than once. Ships such as the Friendship made 
annual  voyages  to  Spitsbergen  from  1629  to  1634,  while  others,  like  the  Advice, 
Adventure or  Bonadventure, seem to have undertaken only one voyage during the same 
period.107
Unfortunately the men who served aboard these vessels, who formed part of the 
first generation of English whalemen, are almost invisible. Little evidence survives for 
the  manning  of,  or  recruitment  to,  Hull  whaling  ships;  nor  is  much  known  about 
conditions of work, discipline and pay. It seems likely, in the light of Dutch and French 
manning  levels,  that  whaling  vessels  sent  out  from Hull  each  carried  a  company of 
between  30  and  55  men.108 In  some  years,  such  as  1626  when  nine  ships  were  at 
Spitsbergen, the trade may have made significant demands on the local labour force. To 
some extent the demand for labour was met partly by employing experienced mariners 
alongside inexperienced landsmen, or “green hands,” who may have included butchers 
and rural labourers from the hinterland of the port.109 This pattern of employment allowed 
the supporters  and promoters  of  the  whaling trade to  argue that  it  contributed to  the 
maintenance of the poor. In 1617 the Hull men claimed to be providing work for 100 
landsmen, cast out of rural service as a result of a recent dearth.110
Within Hull recruitment may have been encouraged by methods of payment that 
gave the company of whaling vessels a share in part  of the returns from the voyage. 
Aboard Hull ships it became customary for members of the crew to receive “oar and fin 
money”  in  addition to  a  wage.111 John Drew received £6 15s,  including  oar  and fin 
105 Surveys from this period suggest that many vessels in Hull were about 100 tons. Brooks, 
Miscellanea,  xxiii-xxiv. V.C.H., 1: 138.
106 TNA, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 78v-82.
107 Based on customs records. TNA, Port Books E.190/316/10&12; 190/317/6&7.
108 Bruijn,  “From Minor  to  Major  Concern,”  46;  J.  Thierry  du  Pasquier,  “The  Whalers  of 
Honfleur in the Seventeenth Century,” Arctic, 37 (1984), 535.
109 Also known as “Greenmen”. Jackson, British Whaling Trade, 72.
110 S.P. 14/94/71.
111 F.W. Brooks (ed.),  The First Order Book of the Hull Trinity House 1632-1665 (Yorkshire 
Archaeological Society, 105, 1942 for 1941), xv.
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money, in 1638, after serving on a voyage to Spitsbergen, despite allegations that he was 
an unsatisfactory cook. In 1635 a mariner who served on a whaling voyage received £6 
19s 6d,  including whale money.112 In some cases wages were supplemented by other 
perquisites. According to the customs accounts, in September 1633 James Lupton, master 
of the  Increase, was allowed one hogshead of oil and 500 pounds of bone for portage. 
About  the  same  time  Richard  Perkins,  master  of  the  Mayflower,  and  the  rest  of  his 
company,  received  600 pounds  of  “wrack  whaile  Fynns.”113 As  in  other  branches  of 
overseas trade, however, issues of pay and service were also a source of tension between 
merchants, masters and mariners, occasionally provoking contentious cases which were 
adjudicated by Trinity House.114
Conditions of work and pay were probably inherited from the fishing trade, and 
adapted  to  meet  the  needs  of  whaling.  A similar  process  of  adaptation  may  have 
influenced the management and financial organization of the new trade, though this is 
difficult to substantiate in detail given the paucity of the surviving evidence. During the 
early  seventeenth  century  a  small  group  of  masters  played  a  leading  role  in  the 
development and organization of the trade, bearing risks and responsibilities, as well as 
undertaking a variety of managerial functions. Masters such as Thomas Marmaduke were 
instrumental  in opening up the Arctic to  commercial  exploitation,  contributing to  the 
much  disputed  discovery of  Trinity Island  and  to  the  exploration  of  the  Spitsbergen 
archipelago. Thomas Anderson, who appears to have been regularly in charge of whaling 
voyages during the 1620s and early 1630s, was also interested in the search for the north 
east  passage.115 Little  of  this venturing was written down, though it  formed part of a 
maritime oral culture in the port which served to vindicate local rights and claims against 
the Muscovy Company.
The surviving customs records indicate that there was a solid core of masters in 
Hull  who acquired  substantial  experience  of  the  whaling  trade during  the  1620s and 
1630s. At least three or four masters, including Thomas and Launcelot Anderson, Richard 
Perkins  and  John  Fowldes,  appear  to  have  been  regularly  engaged  in  voyages  to 
Spitsbergen,  while  another  ten  or  eleven  were  intermittently  involved  in  the  trade. 
Although details of the working careers of such men are scant, most masters possessed 
varied experiences of whaling, serving as mates and harpooners on previous voyages. 
Indeed it was not uncommon for some masters to continue to play a direct role in whale 
hunting as one of the harpooners. For example, John Pybus, aged 44, of Greenwich, who 
was employed as master aboard the  Adventure of Hull in 1656, had served under other 
masters  on  five  previous  voyages  to  Spitsbergen,  and  as  “Master  &  harponeere”  on 
another eleven.116
Little  is  known about  the  merchants  who  sent  these  vessels  out,  or  of  their 
112 Ibid., 18, 32; Jenkins, History of the Whale Fisheries, 150-1.
113 TNA, Port Books, E.190/317/6.
114 Brooks, Miscellanea, 30, 43-4.
115 C.S.P.D. 1619-23,  328.
116 TNA, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, H.C.A. 13/71, ff. 587-588v.
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relationship with the masters they appointed to look after their interests. Merchants of 
Hull  and York promoted the new trade,  but  their  identities and commercial  activities 
remain elusive. Unfortunately the customs records for Hull are of limited value in trying 
to fill in these gaps. While the accounts for 1619 indicate the arrival of two ladings of 
whale oil, walrus tusks and decaying walrus hides for Samuel Dalton and company, those 
for the late 1620s and early 1630s, as well as for 1640, record the entry of goods in the 
name  of  the  Greenland Company.117 In  1633 Richard  Perkins  and  an  associate  were 
described as “agents of the Greenland merchants of York and Hull,” who had shipped 
men for  a  voyage in  Richard Prestwood’s  ship,  but  no more  specific  details  of  their 
employers were provided.118 Earlier accounts for 1623 also list  the landing of oil  and 
bone under the names of ships’ masters. The remaining records for 1634 show the entry 
of whale products for Percival Levitt and company, and Robert Coldcoale and company. 
Levitt was involved in the trade at least until 1643 when he sent out the Whale, under the 
command of Launcelot Anderson, to Spitsbergen.119 While this material demonstrates that 
Arctic  whaling  attracted  the  attention  of  prominent  traders  in  Hull,  such  as  Samuel 
Dalton, it is singularly uninformative regarding the extent of their interests in the trade.
To a considerable degree the organization of the whaling trade in Hull during 
these years appears to have encouraged an overlap in function between merchants and 
masters,  which  was  strengthened  by  a  shared  interest  in  shipowning.  This  was  not 
uncommon, of course, either in other trades or ports, but it was reinforced by the peculiar 
characteristics and development of the whaling trade in Hull. On the one hand successful 
masters acquired extensive economic interests in the trade, while on the other hand the 
members of merchant families were employed as ship-masters on voyages to Spitsbergen. 
Richard Perkins and Richard Prestwood, who were selected by dice to lead the Hull men 
against the ships of the Greenland Company in 1626, owned and set out, in partnership 
with  others,  at  least  four  of  the  nine  local  vessels.120 Perkins  appears  to  have  been 
regularly involved in the trade, becoming one of the most successful whaling-masters in 
Hull during the 1620s and 1630s. He returned from Spitsbergen in 1623 with a lading of 
92 tons of oil, 72 tons in 1630, 107 tons in 1631, 122 tons in 1632, and 121 tons in 1637. 
The figures in Table 2 strongly suggest that there were few masters who were able to 
match the consistency of this record. Representatives of merchant families who became 
involved in the whaling trade as masters included the Raikes brothers, who acquired a 
powerful  hold  over  the  timber  trade  with Norway during  the  1630s.  William Raikes 
served as master of the  Consent in 1634, returning with a lading of 45 tons of oil for 
Percival Levitt and company; Robert Raikes was master of the  Neptune which brought 
back a lading of 74 tons of oil for the Greenland Company during 1640.121
117 TNA, Port Books, E.190/316/10; 190/318/7.
118 Brooks, The First Order Book, 3.
119 Ibid., 63-4.
120 TNA, High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 78v-82.
121 TNA, Port Books, E.190/315/3; 190/316/10&12; 190/317/6&7; V.C.H., 1:142-3.
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Table 2: Returns of whale oil for selected Hull masters, 1622 to 1637
1622/23 1629/30 1630/31 1632/33 1633/34 1636/37
(Tons of oil)
Thomas Anderson 76 45½ 110 26 - -
John Fowldes - 85½ 37 54 60 -
James Lupton - - - 113 39 -
Richard Perkins 92 72 107 122½ - 121
Source: TNA, Port Books E.190/315/3; 190/316/10&12; 190/317/6&7; 190/318/1A.
These men formed part  of  the  wider commercial  and shipping community in 
Hull,  whose interests  were represented by the nomination and election of officials  to 
Trinity  House.  In  1641  William  Raikes,  master  and  ship-owner,  was  nominated  to 
succeed Sir  John Lister  as  an elder brother,  though he failed to  secure  election.  The 
following year he was elected to the post. Thereafter he was elected to serve as a warden 
in 1643, 1652 and 1658.122 Robert Coldcoale, a ship-master who was also interested in 
the whaling trade, was elected to serve as steward in 1651. Richard Perkins also served as 
an elder brother; however one year after the outbreak of the civil war, in August 1643, he 
was  discharged  from office  on  the  grounds  that  he  “had  been  absent  for  two years, 
residing in the enemy’s quarters.” He was re-admitted in 1648.123
The data in Table 1 indicate that the 1620s and early 1630s were the high point of 
the whaling trade in Hull during the seventeenth century.  Evidently the volume of oil 
landed in Hull increased rapidly during the early 1620s, though this was from a low base, 
and grew steadily, despite occasional interruption, until about 1632, after which it appears 
to have experienced a severe decline.  From a peak of 327 tons for 1631, the volume of 
oil fell by half in 1634. Despite a slight recovery during 1640, the amount of oil landed in 
Hull still represented less than 60 percent of the total for 1631. Although the figures for 
whale-bone  in  Table  1  appear  to  follow  a  similar  chronological  pattern,  with  the 
exception of the total for 1640, they need to be interpreted cautiously, particularly given 
the likelihood that bone might have been collected by scavenging dead carcasses floating 
at sea or along the shore at Spitsbergen. At this stage, moreover, bone was of much less 
value and importance than oil. In 1624 the Muscovy Company complained that its price 
in  London  had  recently  fallen  from  two  shillings  to  two  pence  a  pound.124 Prices 
recovered with the growing use of whale-bone in female clothing, but throughout the 
seventeenth century it remained essentially a by-product of the trade in oil.
During the 1620s and 1630s the surviving evidence indicates that annual average 
ladings  of  oil  per vessel  ranged  from  40  to  88  tons;  apart  from  1634,  Table  1 
demonstrates that the annual average lading did not fall below 60 tons. From the 1770s to 
the 1830s, when the whaling trade was of greater significance in Hull, average ladings of 
oil for individual vessels apparently amounted to 88 tons per annum.125 Of course these 
122 Brooks, The First Order Book, 50, 55, 62, 110, 144.
123 Ibid., 53, 56-8. 87, 106. 
124 C.S.P.D. 1623-25, 342.
125 James Joseph Sheahan,  History of the Town and Port of Kingston-upon-Hull (2nd edition; 
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average figures mask wider variations in the annual ladings of Hull whaling vessels, as is 
indicated by the data in Table 2. In most years, for which customs records survive, the 
differences  between  ladings  for  individual  vessels  were  often  two-  or  three-fold. 
Occasionally they were even greater. In an extreme case Richard Perkins entered a cargo 
of  122½ tons  of  oil,  aboard  the  Mayflower,  on  5  September  1633;  five  weeks  later 
Thomas Anderson entered a lading of 26 tons aboard the Adventure.126
Crude estimates for the number of whales killed at Spitsbergen, based on annual 
ladings of oil, are presented in Table1. According to modern calculations, between 20 and 
30 tons of oil could be acquired from an adult right whale; however, Launcelot Anderson 
who had more than thirty years of experience in the whaling trade during the first half of 
the seventeenth century, claimed that the amount of oil ranged from 12 to 20 tons for 
each whale.127 As the actual amount was obviously subject to variation, depending on 
differences in weight and the efficiency of the extractive process, the estimates in Table 1 
err on the side of caution, in order to take account of possible defects and difficulties in 
the boiling of the blubber. On the assumption that each whale produced either a minimum 
of 12 or a maximum of 20 tons of oil, therefore, it seems highly likely that the Hull ships 
rarely killed more than 25 or 26 whales annually at Spitsbergen during the 1620s and 
1630s, and in some years the number was much less. Collectively the data point to a 
striking consistency in the average annual catch, which usually ranged between three and 
five whales for each vessel, though in practice the variation may have been between one 
and seven or more. By comparison modern estimates suggest that during the second half 
of the seventeenth century, Dutch and German vessels killed an average of four or five 
whales per annum.128
During the course of the 1620s and 1630s the Hull men secured a stake in the 
whaling  trade  which  they sustained  with  varying  degrees  of  success.  Although  their 
participation in the trade was modest, it was locally recognized and valued not least for 
its contribution to the wider commercial and shipping economy. Local merchants and 
mariners fought long and hard to protect these interests. They continued to do so despite 
increasingly unfavourable  conditions  during  the  1630s  and  beyond.  Such persistence 
suggests that profit  was to be made from the new trade,  though insufficient  evidence 
survives to calculate with precision the rate of return for Hull whaling vessels. Moreover 
there were considerable differences in cargoes of oil brought back to Hull, ranging from 
just under 20 to more than 120 tons  per vessel. As the price of one ton of oil  varied 
between  £12  and  £20  during  these  years,  gross  earnings  for  individual  ships  could 
fluctuate from £220 to £2,500, excluding the value of bone.129  While it is clear that the 
Beverley, 1866), 362.
126 TNA, Port Books, E.190/317/6; Jenkins, History of the Whale Fisheries, 317.
127 British Library, London, Sloane MS. 3986, f. 79.
128 Richard Vaughan, “Historical Survey of the European Whaling Industry”, in H.C.s’ Jacob, K. 
Snoeijing, R. Vaughan (eds.),  Arctic Whaling (Groningen, 1984), 126 (this is average catch 
per ship). Jenkins, History of the Whale Fisheries, 155 records an average of 7 to 11 whales 
per ship for Hamburg vessels from 1669 to 1698. 
129 In the early eighteenth century it was argued (by Henry Elking,  A View of the Greenland 
Trade and Whale-Fishery (London, 1722), 59) that the cost of setting out a whaling vessel 
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Hull men experienced some poor years, such as 1634 when returns were low, as late as 
1640 some vessels were entering valuable cargoes of oil  from Spitsbergen: Launcelot 
Anderson’s lading of 87 tons, for example, might have been worth between £1,040 and 
£1,740. How much of this was profit depended not only on the costs of the venture, about 
which little is known, but also on the prevailing price of oil in the domestic market. To a 
considerable degree this was linked with the demand for oil  from the manufacture of 
soap, which became increasingly uncertain during the 1630s as a result of attempts by the 
Westminster soap-makers to use alternative raw materials in the manufacturing process. 
In April  1639 when Charles 1 visited York, to try and rally support against the Scots 
invasion, local traders and the merchants of Hull seized the opportunity to accuse the 
Westminster company of exploiting its monopoly to import soap, creating “a want of vent 
for oils brought … from Greenland.”130 The merchants successfully petitioned for the re-
establishment of a soap house in York, which the Hull men agreed to supply with oil at a 
lower price than that charged by the Greenland Company.  But  the implementation of 
these arrangements, which incidentally suggested that the agreement between the Hull 
men and the  Company was breaking  down,  was  thrown into  disarray by the  rapidly 
developing political crisis and the outbreak of the civil war during 1642.
5. Crisis and competition: the failure of a new trade
The civil war sowed dissension and division, inflicted widespread economic and 
social  damage,  and  severely disrupted  overseas  commercial  enterprise.  Although  the 
whaling  trade  survived  the  conflict,  by  the  later  1640s  it  was  in  a  battered  and 
beleaguered  condition.  English  vessels  continued  to  sail  to  Spitsbergen  during  these 
years, but the trade became increasingly intermittent and ineffective, and possibly limited 
to less than a handful of ships. During the 1640s and 1650s English whaling collapsed 
under the burden of mutual hostility between competing and contentious interests.131 The 
later  1640s witnessed a revival  of  the conflict  between the Hull  men and their  long-
standing rivals in London. Within the context of an unprecedented and radical political 
environment, the provincial merchants resurrected old grievances against the Greenland 
Company, which they sought to portray as a monopolizing and oppressive body that was 
damaging  the  trading  interests  of  the  commonwealth.  Following the  abolition  of  the 
monarchy, these grievances created a common platform for various groups in London and 
other provincial ports to use against the Company. As in the past, however, such divisions 
and distractions only served to benefit overseas competitors. While the English squabbled 
amounted to £600. If this applied to the 1620s and 1630s it would suggest that Hull vessels 
would need to return with ladings of at least 50 tons of oil, assuming a price of £12 per ton, 
to break even. During these years 16 out of 26 ladings were of 54 tons or above. Critically, 
however, this notional calculation depends on the price of oil in the domestic market which 
may have fallen below £12 for some of this period, for reasons noted above.
130 The Greenland Company warned that the jobs of 1,000 mariners were at risk if the Soap-
makers banned the use of whale oil. C.S.P.D. 1634-35, 392-4 (which includes a reference to 
Thomas Washer, soap-boiler, who was imprisoned for making soap with oil); C.S.P.D. 1639, 
45, 363-4, 474.
131 Jenkins, History of the Whale Fisheries, 142-5.
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amongst themselves for access to sounds and bays at Spitsbergen, the Dutch turned to 
open-sea whaling, inaugurating a new stage in the Arctic trade, which was no longer tied 
to shore bases. Under these conditions the whaling trade was abandoned in Hull: by the 
1650s and 1660s its market was being supplied with oil and bone by Dutch and German 
shippers.
The confirmation of the Company’s monopoly by the Navy Committee in 1645 
failed to deflect the campaign of its rivals in favour of opening up the whaling trade.132 
This loose alliance of potentially competing interests presented itself as an amalgam of 
independent traders, who were defending the interests of the freemen of England against 
the unjust pretensions of a privileged city institution. The Hull men played a leading part 
in launching the attack against the Company. In December 1649 Thomas Anderson and 
Nicholas Gatonby, two experienced whaling masters, who described themselves as “poor 
men,”  sought  compensation  from  the  Company  for  damage  to  their  property  at 
Spitsbergen, which they probably sustained during the 1620s.133 In January 1650 Richard 
Perkins was ordered to attend the powerful Admiralty Committee to give evidence in the 
dispute.  After  reviewing  the  details  of  the  case,  the  committee  decreed  that  the 
Company’s actions against the Hull men were “oppressive and fit to be relieved by the 
justice of Parliament.”134 Despite efforts by the Council of State to persuade both sides to 
compromise, the dispute dragged on for several years, acting as a focal point for wider 
grievances concerning the organization and regulation of the whaling trade.
By  the  early  1650s  a  group  of  whaling  masters  and  merchants,  including 
representatives from Hull, London and Great Yarmouth, were publicly seeking support 
for their case within and beyond parliament. In January 1654 they presented a petition to 
parliament, published as  The Case of many Freemen of England that have adventured,  
and desire to adventure, to fish in Greenland.135 Although it drew on long-standing claims 
by the Hull men, the petition was tailored to the new political environment of republican 
government.  Under  such conditions  corporate  ventures  established  during the  rule  of 
monarchy were vulnerable to a variety of charges, particularly as, in the eyes of their 
enemies, they appeared to rest on a discredited and defunct royal prerogative. Thus the 
Muscovy Company stood accused of unjustly assuming the sole right  of  the whaling 
trade,  against  the prior  claims of  the  Hull  men:   “The fishing of  Greenland,”  it  was 
robustly asserted, was “discovered above 40 years since, by some Merchants of Hull.”136 
Furthermore  the  Company  used  force  and  imprisonment,  including  the  seizure  of 
property, allegedly with the connivance of the Privy Council, in order to prevent its rivals 
from whaling at Spitsbergen. Consequently for many years it effectively monopolized the 
trade, arbitrarily raising the prices of oil and bone, “to the great oppression of the people, 
the discouragement of Mariners, and preventing the increase of Shipping and Seamen, 
132 Jackson, “The Rise and Fall of English Whaling,” 55-67.
133 C.S.P.D. 1649-50, 431, 479, 482, 486, 509.
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and (the) decay of trading in this Nation.”137 These circumstances also enabled the Dutch 
to increase their role as suppliers of oil and bone to the English market. Although Anglo-
Dutch commerce was disrupted by war during the early 1650s, it did little to reduce their 
growing importance  in  the  trade.  Shortly after  the  end  of  the  conflict  twelve  Dutch 
vessels apparently entered Hull with cargoes of oil;  during October 1654, indeed, “in 
regard of the late disappointment of the Greenland fleet, and the great want of oil to carry 
on the trades of cloth and soap,” it was proposed in parliament that “licence be given to 
fetch it out of Holland.”138 The Company’s control of the whaling trade thus led to high 
prices, the oppression of independent traders, and an alarming dependence on overseas 
markets.
These general  complaints provided a necessary context  for  the more pressing 
concerns  of  the  petitioners  regarding  access  to  Horn  Sound  and  Bell  Sound  at 
Spitsbergen. Since the inception of the whaling trade, the English had used the bays and 
harbours in both Sounds as their main hunting grounds. By the early 1650s, however, the 
Company was insisting on its sole right to hunt for whales in these waters, while offering 
to leave other parts of Spitsbergen “free for all other English men to adventure unto.”139 
According  to  the  independent  traders  this  was  a  self-interested  and  empty  gesture, 
intended  to  allow  the  Company  to  retain  control  over  the  best  whaling  grounds  at 
Spitsbergen, which were “the only certain places for fishing, most of the other Harbours 
being many times inaccessible by reason of the Ice”.140 The Company’s warning of the 
danger of conflict and bloodshed, if other vessels were allowed to hunt in Horn Sound 
and Bell Sound, was bluntly dismissed by the petitioners.  Both regions, they insisted, 
“have commonly fish enough for more fishers then ever have adventured thither: The 
Harbour of Bell-sound being 15 miles in breadth, and 30 miles in length or more; so that 
several Companies may fish in the aforesaid Harbour, and make their Oyl, and yet never 
molest each other.”141
In denying the Company’s claims, the petitioners went on to question whether its 
proposals  were  for  the  good  of  the  commonwealth.  Given  its  recent  record,  the 
independent traders warned that the Company would be unable to meet domestic demand 
for oil and bone, leading to shortages and higher prices. In response to the Company’s 
claim that the whaling trade would collapse without its continued participation, which 
was dependent on the retention of its rights, the petitioners asserted that “several persons 
of good estates” were prepared “to set  out  Shipping for  Greenland,  … of double the 
Burden that the said Company have … set out, … if the trade might be declared to be 
wholly free  for  every English man.”142  Apparently an expedition of  several  vessels, 
amounting to about 1,100 tons, was under preparation for Spitsbergen. Some ships had 
137 S.P. 18/65/60.
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already departed. But the petitioners warned that these voyages would be overthrown if 
the Company’s proposals regarding Bell Sound and Horn Sound were accepted.
In the eyes of these self-appointed representatives for the freemen of England, 
the  opening  up  of  the  whaling  trade  at  Spitsbergen  was  linked  with  the  economic 
improvement  of  the  commonwealth.  The  debate  over  different  forms  of  commercial 
organization had been heard before, and the argument that the economy was “cheaper 
served by many men, then by a particular Company,” was well rehearsed; nonetheless, 
the appeal for free whaling at Spitsbergen, on the grounds that it was “the proper right of 
every free born English man,” had far-reaching and radical implications that ranged well 
beyond the issues in dispute.143 The attack on an oppressive monopoly which was seen to 
discourage  trade  and  shipping,  combined  with  an  emphasis  on  rights  and  freedom, 
suggests that the authors of The Case of many Freemen were influenced by the campaign 
of the Levellers in London during the later 1640s. Among other demands for reform, that 
appealed to the industrious “middling sort,” the Levellers called for overseas trade to be 
free  from  “all  monopolizing  and  engrossing  by  companies  or  otherwise.”144 In 
representing,  if  not  directly  articulating,  the  anxieties  and  ambitions  of  independent 
traders and ship-masters,  this hostility to commercial privilege possessed considerable 
relevance  for  whaling  merchants  and  masters.  It  was  a  common  thread  that  linked 
potentially competing interest in London, Hull and Great Yarmouth. Among such men, 
who  were  struggling  to  make  ends  meet,  the  reliance  on  birthright  and  liberty  was 
intended to strengthen the case against the Company’s continued control of the trade, 
though in Hull the influence of a garrison of soldiers from the New Model Army, who 
were themselves influenced by the Levellers, should not be discounted.145
The public presentation of these issues deepened the dispute over the whaling 
trade, encouraging the rival parties to adopt an entrenched position which narrowed the 
opportunity for compromise. Early in 1654 a committee of the Council  of Trade was 
appointed to hear and determine the matter. Representatives for the Muscovy Company 
continued to claim that “severall Interests cannot with any convenyence fish for Whales 
in one Harbour without prejudice one to another.”146  Consequently their solution was for 
a clear demarcation of interests, among the English, between different bays and harbours. 
Given the Company’s experience at Spitsbergen this was the only way to avoid conflict 
and controversy between whaling vessels. Francis Ashe, the governor of the Company, 
drew  attention  to  an  incident  that  occurred  during  1653  which  encapsulated  these 
difficulties. Thus
143 S.P. 18/65/60.
144 A.S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty (2nd edition; London, 1974), 319, 339, 425; F.D. 
Dow,  Radicalism in the  English Revolution  1640-1660 (London,  1985),  pp.  47-48;  C.B. 
Macpherson,  The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, 
1962), 120-1, 143, 156.
145 H.N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution (London, 1961), 123, 151, 532-3; 
Joseph Hemingway, The Declaration of the Officers of the Garrison of Hull (London, 1649); 
The Humble Remonstrance and Resolves of Col. Overtons Regiment (London, 1649).
146 S.P. 18/65/61.
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a Whale being struck by those employed by the Company, divers of the Contrary 
Partyes struck in their Irons into the same whale, & occasion’d a controversye – 
which  rise  to  a  very great  height,  & neere  unto  bloodshed,  had it  not  been 
prevented by a third Party; yet nevertheless the Contest continued soe long, that 
the losse of the whale was much endangered being neere driven into the Sea, 
which  occasioned  30  houres  labour  to  our  people  to  save  her,  & hath  now 
occasioned a suit in Lawe … And it is further observed, that the whales coming 
into the Sound to Gender, Feed & rubb themselves doe stay there for a long 
tyme togeather,  soe  that  when one Interest  is  onely there,  They can take or 
pursue such as are most likely to goe first out, & to follow the rest at leizure, 
whereas if there be divers Interests, each Party disturbes the Fish wheresoever it 
appeares, having onely respect to their owne profitt, & soe suddainly scares or 
drives away the whales, & being they cannot attaine to it themselves, are not 
wanting to use meanes to hinder one another, & put by others when they cannot 
gett the Whales themselves, as the last yeare divers whales were lost & went out 
of the Harbour by the eager pursuit of the severall Partyes. And whereas it is 
also objected by the contrary Party,  (though most untruely),  That  the whales 
come in one day & goe out the next, To that we answere, That it hath been by 
long experience knowne,  & wilbe made good by Oath,  if  required,  That  the 
whales  not  being disturbed  doe  usually lye  in  the Harbours  for  many dayes 
togeather, and soe consequently much better for the fishing.147 
According to Ashe, conflicts over the possession of stricken whales were regular 
occurrences which could only be prevented by the establishment  of  separate whaling 
grounds at Spitsbergen. Another solution might have been to follow the Dutch into open-
sea  whaling,  to  the  west  of  Spitsbergen,  but  this  appears  to  have  been  beyond  the 
capability of the English during the 1650s.
The Company’s case was reinforced by a claim that Bell Sound was too small to 
support the whaling activities of different interests.  Covering a region of about seven 
miles  in  breadth,  and  ten  in  length,  between  30  and  40  well-manned  shallops  were 
“sufficient to fish that Harbour if not disturbed by others, and may kill as many whales as 
if there were doble the Nomber of boates.”148 Contrary to the assertions of the Company’s 
rivals, Ashe warned that an increase in the number of whaling vessels in the Sound would 
not lead to an increase in the production of oil. Three vessels of the Company reportedly 
returned  from  Spitsbergen  with  more  oil  than  twice  as  many  ships  sent  out  by 
independent traders. Paradoxically, according to the Company’s perspective, competition 
led to a decline in shipments of oil, which had fallen by more than half in recent years. As 
a result, in the domestic market the price of oil had increased from £18 to £30 a ton; that 
for bone had risen from £1 to £8 a hundredweight.149
The Company’s proposal to restrict access to Bell Sound to its own vessels came 
with a warning that  the congregation of English whaling ships in one harbour would 
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of interests which the Company called for would thus maintain “the English propriety in 
that Country,” while helping to deal with the increasing threat from the Dutch who were 
accused of selling “the worst & foulest of their Commodityes in this Commonwealth.”150 
In response to the claims of the independent traders, concerning their ability to manage 
the  trade more  economically,  Ashe pointed out  that  the  “same Men who make  these 
pretences  were  trayned up  to  that  Fishing  by the  Company,  and  have  of  late  yeares 
deserted them for their owne … which bringeth a greater charge upon the voyage & … 
makes the Comodity dearer.”151 In concluding,  Ashe reminded the committee that  the 
Company’s  right  to  the  whaling trade was based  on  its  discovery of  Spitsbergen,  as 
demonstrated in the confirmation and renewal of its privileges.
The revival of this damaging dispute, which drew on contested claims concerning 
prior discovery in the Arctic, was both cause and consequence of the disintegration of the 
English whaling trade during the 1650s. But the underlying competition for access to the 
southern sounds and bays at Spitsbergen, an inherent characteristic of the trade since its 
earliest days, appears to have been intensified by the declining number of whales due to 
sustained commercial hunting, which was compounded with climatic change, particularly 
the onset of colder weather during the 1640s and beyond. Not only did this leave bays 
and harbours enveloped with ice for longer, cutting into the hunting season, but also it 
may have contributed to increasing mortality among whales.152 Implicitly these problems 
were acknowledged in the evidence that was produced during the dispute between the 
Company and its opponents during the early 1650s: too many vessels, it seemed, were 
chasing too few whales. According to the Company, even “the best Harbors make more 
loosing  voyages  then  gayning,  but  once  in  3,  4,  or  5  yeares  the  Whales  Coming in 
plentifully by scoales.”153
In an attempt to deal with these unfavourable conditions the Company proposed 
the establishment of a general joint stock to manage and maintain the whaling trade at 
Spitsbergen. To a considerable degree the plan built on existing arguments in favour of 
commercial control and regulation. Thus it was claimed that competition disrupted whale 
hunting in Bell Sound; it reduced profits; and it threatened to undermine English claims 
to the rest of the archipelago. If a “generall liberty” prevailed, so that “every one may 
freely enjoy everything, and every place in Greenland, that hee can first arrive unto & 
possesse,” the Company warned, it “will beget an endeavour to prevent others, which 
must  necessarily occasion them to sett  out  a month or some tyme before the season, 
which as it augmentes the Charge, soe it destroyes the profitt which is the wheele of all 
150 S.P. 18/65/61. The description of this as “the most part blubber” indicates that the Dutch 
were moving away from boiling it on the shore at Spitsbergen. Some Dutch vessels were 
already beginning to carry try-works between decks. C.S.P.D. 1655, p. 325.
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L. Hacquebord, “The History of Early Dutch Whaling: A Study from the Ecological Angle,” 
in Jacob, Snoeijing, Vaughan, Arctic Whaling, 135-48.
153 S.P. 18/65/62.
55
The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord
designes.”154 The failure of the proposal, according to this view, would spell the end for 
the whaling trade.  For while a  declining number  of  English vessels  clashed over  the 
capture of one or two whales in the bays of Bell Sound, the “Dutch and French, who fish 
in numerous Fleets at Sea, and by plying neere the mouth of the Harbours, breake & beat 
the  scoales  of  Whales,”  leaving  less  available  for  others.155 In  effect  the  Company 
threatened to withdraw from the trade if its plan was rejected.
While portraying itself as the defender of English interests at Spitsbergen, whose 
rivals  were  identified  as  opportunistic,  self-interested  and  insolvent  adventurers,  the 
Company’s concern to have the first choice of bays and harbours, which would then be 
barred to others, betrayed its essential purpose. The proposal for a general joint stock thus 
met with a hostile rejoinder from the rivals of the Company. Their response, including a 
list  of  propositions  for  the  regulation  and  encouragement  of  the  whaling  trade,  was 
published during 1654 as The Heads of the Answer of several Adventurers to Greenland,  
To  the  claim  of  the  Muscovia  Company,  of  the  two  Harbors  of  Bel-Sound  and  
Hornsound.156 Unpublished versions of this material, which may have circulated among 
the merchant community, indicate that much of it was compiled by Edward Whittwell, 
who was representing the interests  of  independent  traders in London.157 It  vigorously 
reasserted the case for an open trade at Spitsbergen, free from the controlling influence of 
the Company. Although little of this was new, the attack on the Company was more direct 
and designed to draw attention to its failure to serve the needs of the commonwealth. 
While it had “no right in Law or Equity to the said Harbors, more then any other English 
men that will adventure thither,” it also “used in the late Kings time all unjust, illegal, and 
arbitrary means  possible  to  suppress  all  but  themselves.”158 At  the  same  time  it  was 
accused  of  discouraging  native  whalemen;  of  undervaluing  their  labour;  and  of 
employing Basque harpooners who were paid double their wages. Against this The Heads 
of the Answer insisted that the only way to meet the threat of Dutch competition was by 
encouraging more vessels to sail to Spitsbergen, whereby “industry and ingenuity will be 
more advanced, and Marriners and Navigation increased.”159 In order to deal with the 
continued risk of violent rivalry between competing English interests,  parliament was 
urged to introduce legislation for the regulation of the trade.
In a separate submission to the committee of the Council of Trade, at the end of 
January 1654, the Hull men presented their reasons why the trade “ought to be free, and 
not  restrained  to  any  one  particular  Company.”160 Though  influenced  by  the 
circumstances of their protracted dispute with the Muscovy Company, they laid aside the 
issue of prior discovery, concentrating more on commercial rights and public benefits, in 
a way which reflected, and tried to take advantage of, the new political environment. In 
154 S.P. 18/65/62 & 63.
155 S.P. 18/65/63 & 64.
156 S.P. 18/65/67.
157 C.S.P.D. 1653-54, 379-80, 392-3; C.S.P.D. 1654, 16.
158 S.P. 18/65/67.
159 S.P. 18/65/67.
160 S.P. 18/65/69. It was delivered to the Council by Richard Eccleston.
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these  conditions  it  was  possible  to  portray  a  repressive  corporation  as  an  agent  of 
unrestrained royal power. According to the Hull men, the whaling trade should be free 
because it was a native right of those who lived under the same government, “beareing … 
(a) share of the common-charge,” to enjoy the same liberties and privileges as others.161 
Thus the Company’s attempt to engross the trade was “rounded upon a monopolizing 
pattent: which came from prerogative power, and is not consistent with the freedome of a 
Common-wealth, and the members thereof.”162 This appeal to native right was reinforced 
by  the  wider  economic  and  social  gains  from  an  open  trade  which  included  the 
employment of large numbers of labouring men, as well as an increase in shipping and 
seamen.  In addition the growth of the trade would safeguard the provision of supplies of 
oil and bone for the domestic market.
An  effective  resolution  of  this  dispute  continued  to  be  delayed  by  the 
determination of independent traders in Hull, Great Yarmouth and London to defend their 
interests  in  the  whaling  trade,  in  the  face  of  resolute  resistance  from the  Muscovy 
Company. Accumulated grievances, soured by mutual mistrust and resentment, stretching 
back  over  several  decades,  appeared  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a  short  term 
compromise, providing an unfavourable environment for a longer term agreement that 
took  account  of  the  proposals  put  forward  by the  Company and its  rivals.  Although 
representatives  from these  metropolitan  and  provincial  groups  were  nominated  to  a 
committee during 1654 to draw up regulations for the forthcoming whaling season, they 
were unable to reach a suitable settlement. The representatives for the new adventurers of 
Hull, as they were now described, included Roger Drayton, John Jolliffe, George Poyner, 
Francis  Pargiter  and  Robert  Cumminge.163  After  several  meetings,  the  committee 
admitted that “a fitt Regulation cannot be speedily settled.”164  In its place the Hull men 
and the Company agreed to send out seven vessels to Spitsbergen, three of which were to 
go to Bell Sound, while the remainder were to be distributed between Bottle Cove, Green 
Harbour and Horn Sound. Evidently this arrangement threatened to divide the provincial 
rivals  of  the  Company.  A proposal  by  Thomas  Horth,  one  of  the  leading  whaling 
merchants  in  Great  Yarmouth,  for  the  distribution  of  English  vessels  at  Spitsbergen, 
apparently failed to get the support of the Hull men, as a result of which “some harbours 
will be unfished and insecure.”165
These unresolved issues point to deep-seated weaknesses in the organization of 
the early English whaling trade. Despite a warning from the Council of State in 1652 that 
“the whale fishing is of consequence, and should not by dissensions be allowed to fall 
into the hands of strangers,” the English were unable to mount an effective response to 
overseas competition, either from the Dutch or the French, during these years.166 The first 
Anglo-Dutch war from 1652 to 1654 added to these problems by severely disrupting 
161 S.P. 18/65/69.
162 S.P. 18/65/69.
163 C.S.P.D. 1654, 30.
164 S.P. 18/68/66.
165 C.S.P.D. 1654, 41.
166 C.S.P.D. 1651-52, 177-8.
57
The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord
overseas trade and shipping, particularly for east coast ports which were vulnerable to the 
activities  of  enemy  men-of-war.  In  practice  the  war  probably  had  a  greater  impact 
indirectly, as the costs of trade increased due to the threat of privateering in the North 
Sea.  To some extent  state support  may have helped to maintain the trade,  at  least  in 
providing protections  for  experienced harpooners  against  the  risk of  impressment  for 
naval service. However, the evidence strongly suggests that the English struggled to send 
out more than a handful of vessels annually to Spitsbergen. By contrast, 70 Dutch ships 
were  reportedly  convoyed  to  Spitsbergen  by  three  men-of-war  during  1654.167 The 
following year between 24 and 50 French vessels apparently “made great voyages” to the 
northern whaling grounds.168 In 1656 there seem to have been seven English ships at 
Spitsbergen,  only one of  which  was  from Hull.  By 1657 the  London Company was 
complaining about the import of large amounts of oil and bone by the Dutch, in defiance 
of the Navigation Acts, which left it with large stocks that it could not sell. Although the 
Company’s rights to the whaling trade were confirmed in January 1658, when it  was 
granted the sole right of access to Bell Sound and Horn Sound, it was a hollow victory. 
By then the domestic market in England had been effectively captured by its overseas 
competitors.169
The Hull men played a prominent role in this early, though unsuccessful, phase 
of English whaling in the Arctic.  From the second decade of the seventeenth century 
through to the 1650s they were among the most persistent promoters of the new trade in 
England. But, the development of these interests was heavily influenced by an unstable 
compound  of  competition,  conflict  and  occasional  cooperation.  The  prolonged  and 
complex dispute between the Hull men and their rivals in London may have inadvertently 
placed limits on the scale of local and national enterprise.  It also raised wider issues, 
concerning maritime rights and commercial organization, which were never effectively 
resolved during this period. The revival of the dispute during the 1640s and 1650s had a 
radicalizing  effect  on  the  position  of  the  independent  traders,  whose  hostility  to 
commercial monopoly was reinforced by an appeal for an open and free whaling trade as 
a  means  of  guaranteeing  the  rights  of  free-born  English  subjects  living  under 
commonwealth rule. This appeal met with little success during the 1650s, and when the 
trade was subsequently opened up, in 1672, it was too late for the English to recover lost 
ground to their competitors.170
In  effect  the  scale  and  character  of  the  whaling  trade  in  Hull,  London  and 
elsewhere left it deeply vulnerable to overseas competition, especially from the Dutch. 
167 C.S.P.D. 1654, 176, 434 (protections from impressment).
168 C.S.P.D. 1655, 509, 523.
169 C.S.P.D.  1657-58,  140-1,  161,  280,  343; Ashley,  Financial  and Commercial  Policy,  120; 
John C. Appleby, “‘A Voyage to Greenland for the Catching of Whales’: English Whaling 
Enterprise in the Seventeenth Century,” International Journal of Maritime History, 9 (1997), 
36-7.
170 Scott,  Constitution and Finance of  English,  Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies,  2: 
74-5, 379.
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The English were ill-equipped to respond to the growth of Dutch whaling, which was on 
such a scale as to encourage adaptability and innovation. By contrast the modest nature of 
the English trade appears to have promoted conservatism and inflexibility. While English 
vessels persisted with bay-whaling during the 1640s and 1650s, despite warning signs of 
a decline in the number of whales at Spitsbergen, the Dutch turned to open-sea whaling 
with considerable success. In these circumstances by the later 1650s the Hull men had 
abandoned whaling as an economic enterprise; they were soon followed by the London 
Company. By 1669, it was reported that there was only one English vessel at Spitsbergen, 
compared  with  between  300  and  400  Dutch  ships.171 Consequently  it  became 
commonplace during the later seventeenth century to lament that England had lost the 
whaling trade to the Dutch. As the author of  Britannia Languens noted in 1680,  “the 
Dutch had far beaten us out of these Trades.”172 Although this was politically appealing, it 
was an incomplete explanation for the disappearance of the Hull whaling trade during the 
second half of the seventeenth century. Despite the apparent opportunities presented to 
overseas suppliers by the decline of local enterprise, the volume of whale oil imported 
into Hull during the 1660s and 1670s remained small, and was often barely noticeable. In 
effect the northern market for oil, the mainstay of the trade, appears to have collapsed; 
the combined pressures on demand and supply thus created insuperable difficulties which 
were intensified by domestic competition and rivalries. It may not have been until the 
1750s and 1760s, with the spread of street lighting based on the use of whale oil, that the 
market recovered.173 When Daniel Defoe visited Hull in the early eighteenth century, its 
involvement in the trade was already a distant memory. While expressing admiration for 
the  commerce  and  business  of  the  port,  particularly  with  the  Netherlands,  Defoe 
recounted how “They had once set up a Greenland fishery, and it went on with success 
for a time; but it decayed in the time when the Dutch wars were so frequent, and the 
house  built  by the  Greenland  merchants  is  now turned  into  granaries  for  corn,  and 
warehouses for other goods.”174
171 Thirsk  and  Cooper  (eds.),  Seventeenth-Century  Economic  Documents,  70;  Scoresby,  An 
Account of the Arctic Regions, 2: 56.
172 Britannia Languens, or A Discourse of Trade (London, 1680), in John Ramsay MacCulloch 
(ed.), Early English Tracts on Commerce (London, 1856), p. 409.
173 Customs records show no significant import of whale oil. TNA, Port Books E.190/320/10; 
190/321/4; 190/324/9; 190/325/3; 190/331/15. This was probably linked with changes to the 
soap manufacturing industry in York, though the subject deserves further investigation. On 
street-lighting see Jackson, British Whaling Trade, 56.
174 Daniel Defoe, A Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain, 2 vols. (London, 1928), 2: 
243, 245.
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